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ELECTION LAW LOCALISM AND DEMOCRACY*
RICHARD BRIFFAULT**
American federal and state elections are largely run by local officials. Although
election law is almost entirely determined by the federal government and the
states, elections are actually conducted by thousands of different county and city
elections offices. This decentralization of election administration has often, and
fairly, been criticized as resulting in undesirable interlocal variation in the
application of election rules, inefficiency, and racial discrimination. Yet, in
2020, local election administration, particularly in large urban areas, was a
source of strength. Local officials proved to be resilient, innovative, and attentive
to local conditions. The record-high turnout in the face of a once-in-a-century
pandemic was in considerable part due to their efforts to make voting easier and
more accessible. These efforts, in turn, have triggered a reaction, with many
states adopting new laws intended to curtail local authority.
This Article examines the local role in the 2020 election, together with the state
pushback of 2021, as a study of both the surprising significance of local officials
in promoting democracy and the place of local government in our
intergovernmental system more generally. Local election offices are among the
least formally empowered units of local government. They are charged solely
with implementing state laws and policies. Yet, the 2020 election indicates they
can exercise their authority to promote democracy in their communities. On the
other hand, as with local governments generally, local power in election
administration is fragile and can be stripped away by hostile state-level forces.
By showcasing the importance of local elections officials, the 2020 election has
made them a new site of conflict over the strength of American democracy.
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INTRODUCTION

The local role in the administration of federal and state elections would
appear to be an unlikely topic for a conference on home rule. Some state
constitutional provisions may grant home rule localities authority to adopt their
own rules with respect to elections for local office.1 But home rule does not give
local election officials any policy-making autonomy with respect to the
administration of elections for state and federal office. Quite the opposite. As
the Texas Supreme Court explained in one of the many state-local election
disputes in the Lone Star State in 2020, when county clerks administer elections
they act as “subordinate and derivative branch[es] of state government,”2
possessing, in classic Dillon’s Rule fashion, “only such powers and privileges as
have been expressly or impliedly conferred” by state law.3
1. For a thoughtful treatment of the tension between home rule authority over local elections
and potentially preemptive state election laws, see generally Joshua S. Sellers & Erin A. Scharff,
Preempting Politics: State Power and Local Democracy, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1361 (2020). Professor Joshua
Douglas has provided a detailed examination of the ability of local governments to expand the franchise,
change the voting process, adopt campaign finance reforms, and otherwise regulate local elections (e.g.,
elections for local office and local ballot propositions). See generally Joshua A. Douglas, The Right To
Vote Under Local Law, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1039 (2017). My focus in this Article is on the impact
of local administrative actions on state and federal elections.
2. State v. Hollins, 620 S.W.3d 400, 403–04 (Tex. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Avery
v. Midland County, 406 S.W.2d 422, 426 (Tex. 1966), vacated on other grounds, 390 U.S. 474 (1968)).
3. Id. at 404 (quoting Wasson Ints., Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, 489 S.W.3d 427, 430 (Tex.
2016)).
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Yet, the local role in running federal and state elections is crucial. As
President Obama’s Commission on Election Administration noted at the outset
of its 2014 report: “The United States runs its elections unlike any other country
in the world. Responsibility for elections is entrusted to local officials in
approximately 8,000 different jurisdictions.”4 This has been true throughout
American history, and, although “[t]he power and discretion wielded by local
staff has been trimmed by state and federal law since 2000, . . . local authority
remains substantial.”5 The local role is greatest in matters classically considered
“housekeeping”—registering voters; processing absentee ballot applications;
locating and managing polling places and vote centers; selecting, operating, and
maintaining voting machinery; designing ballots; hiring and training poll
workers; checking names against registration lists and checking IDs. These
actions shape the quality of the voting experience and are critical in determining
whether, in practice, eligible electors will be able to cast ballots and have them
counted.6 The local role in these matters is nominally limited simply to carrying
out state commands locally. But local election officials wield considerable
discretion and can directly affect the implementation of state rules.7 As the
actions of local election officials in the 2020 election—and the backlash to those
actions in many states in 2021—illustrate, local election offices play an essential
role in making democracy work.
Much of the surprising success of the 2020 election—record high turnout
facilitated by a massive, unprecedented shift to early and mail-in voting
undertaken in the midst of a once-in-a-century pandemic, with few Election
Day problems and no security breakdowns or proven fraud—is attributable in
large measure to the work of local election officials.8 Local administrators
4. PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN., THE AMERICAN VOTING EXPERIENCE:
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON ELECTION
ADMINISTRATION 1 (2014), http://web.mit.edu/supportthevoter/www/files/2014/01/Amer-VotingExper-final-draft-01-09-14-508.pdf [https://perma.cc/TNU2-PMHW].
5. ALEC C. EWALD, THE WAY WE VOTE: THE LOCAL DIMENSION OF AMERICAN
SUFFRAGE 2 (2009).
6. See, e.g., PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N ON ELECTION ADMIN., supra note 4, at 32; EWALD, supra
note 5, at 98–101.
7. See, e.g., Peterson v. Dean, 777 F.3d 334, 346–47, 349 (6th Cir. 2015) (finding that Tennessee
county administrators of elections, who can influence “precinct boundaries, polling stations, and early
voting locations” and exercise discretion with respect to “policy matters . . . of political concern,” are
subject to patronage removal); Soelter v. King County, 931 F. Supp. 741, 745 (W.D. Wash. 1996),
aff’d, 132 F.3d 40 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The Elections Manager [in the State of Washington] possesses a
substantial degree of responsibility and discretion . . . . The officeholder makes significant decisions
concerning how elections are conducted, where polling places are located, how and in what form
information is disseminated to voters and the public at large, and in certain cases whether precincts are
combined, united, or divided . . . . [H]e or she conducts hearings and issues binding rulings on
challenges to voter registration.”).
8. See, e.g., Nathaniel Persily & Charles Stewart III, Introduction: The Miracle and Tragedy of the
2020 U.S. Election, in STANFORD-MIT HEALTHY ELECTIONS PROJECT, THE VIRUS AND THE VOTE:
ADMINISTERING THE 2020 ELECTION IN A PANDEMIC 2, 18 (Chelsey Davidson & Zahavah Levine
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proved to be resilient, innovative, and attentive to local conditions. They
quickly adapted to the extraordinary circumstances of 2020 by finding new ways
and places to vote. They addressed the public health threats posed by voting in
traditional cramped polling sites by finding more spacious places consistent
with social-distancing goals,9 and they recruited tens of thousands of new and
younger poll workers to replace the older workers most at risk from COVID19.10 Local election officials around the country demonstrated a commitment—
often challenged by state officials, political campaigns, or hostile advocacy
groups—to make it easier for eligible voters to vote. These local efforts, in turn,
triggered state responses that have curtailed local authority. Following the
playbook of the new preemption,11 some states even adopted punitive measures
that could subject local election officials to civil or criminal penalties, or the loss
of their jobs, for failure to comply with these new state restrictions.12
It would be a mistake to overly valorize the role of local election officials
in promoting democracy. Local election administrators can be incompetent or
antidemocratic, as illustrated by the New York City Board of Elections’
disastrous initial miscounting of the ranked-choice votes in the city’s 2021
mayoral primary13 and by the shenanigans of the Q-Anon-friendly Mesa
Colorado County Clerk in 2020.14 And many state election officials also

eds., 2021) [hereinafter THE VIRUS AND THE VOTE], https://fsi.stanford.edu/news/virus-and-voteadministering-2020-election-pandemic [https://perma.cc/FJR7-9X9S] (describing the “historic and
heroic administration of the 2020 election”).
9. See Maia Brockbank, Alexa Gold, Emily Kohn, Anastasiia Malenko & Alex Stout, Polling Place
Management in the 2020 General Election, in THE VIRUS AND THE VOTE, supra note 8, at 292, 298–99.
10. See Evie Freeman, Jacob McCall, Maia Brockbank & Anastasiia Malenko, Poll Worker
Recruitment in the 2020 General Election, in THE VIRUS AND THE VOTE, supra note 8, at 261, 263–67.
11. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, The Challenge of the New Preemption, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1995, 1995
(2018) (explaining that in recent years many state legislatures have engaged in a new and more
aggressive form of preemption of local lawmaking that includes the adoption of punitive measures such
as fines, civil or criminal liability, and removal from office for local officials who adopt or support local
laws subject to state preemption).
12. See id. at 2002–07 (discussing the rise of punitive preemption).
13. See Eric Lach, New York City’s Needless Election Fiasco, NEW YORKER (July 2, 2021), https://
www.newyorker.com/news/our-local-correspondents/new-york-citys-needless-election-fiasco [https://
perma.cc/5E2Q-LDG8 (dark archive)]. Nor is New York City’s Board of Elections the only local
elections office that has recently made serious mistakes. See, e.g., Tom Magnarelli & Vaughn
Golden, After 2020 Election ‘Failure,’ Oneida County Elections Commissioners Resign, WSKG (Feb. 17,
2021), http://wskg.org/news/after-2020-election-failure-oneida-county-elections-commissioner-resign
[https://perma.cc/LB5C-SUZY].
14. See Matt Shuham, Judge Bars Conspiratorial Colorado Clerk from Election Administration After
Suspicious Leak, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Oct. 14, 2021, 2:46 PM), https://talkingpointsmemo.
com/news/judge-bars-conspiratorial-colorado-clerk-from-election-administration-after-suspicious-leak
[https://perma.cc/GJX7-8J3C]; Matt Shuham, A QAnoner Posted One County’s Election Passwords. The
County Clerk Allegedly Helped., TALKING POINTS MEMO (Aug. 31, 2021, 2:44 PM), https://talking
pointsmemo.com/news/a-qanoner-posted-one-countys-election-passwords-the-county-clerk-allegedlyhelped [https://perma.cc/4Q3C-GLSL].
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undertook major and successful efforts to help voters in 2020.15 But what is
particularly striking is the degree to which local election officials—including,
but not limited to, those in major urban centers like Maricopa County, Arizona
(Phoenix); Fulton County, Georgia (Atlanta); and Harris County, Texas
(Houston)16—were willing to push and even push beyond the limits of stategranted local authority to make it possible for their constituents to vote.
This Article treats the local role in conducting the 2020 election together
with the state pushback of 2021 as a valuable case study of both the surprising
significance of local election administration in promoting democracy and the
place of local government in our federal-state-local system more generally. It
proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief overview of the role of local
election officials (“LEOs”) in administering federal and state elections. Part II
focuses on how LEOs responded to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, paying
particular attention to some of the key litigation provoked by aggressive local
efforts to facilitate voting. Part III turns to the 2021 state legislative response,
with several Republican-dominated legislatures, driven by the Trumpian
challenge to the legitimacy of the 2020 election, moving to strip LEOs of their
powers to expand access to the franchise and imposing new administrative
burdens and penalties on them. Part IV concludes with some observations about
the local role in running elections and the significance of local election
administration for thinking about local government and state-local relations
more broadly. On the one hand, the 2020 election indicates that even the least
formally empowered local units, lacking any claim of home rule and charged
solely with implementing state laws and policies, can be attentive to local needs
and concerns. Their actions reveal both the will and the ability to promote
democracy in their communities. On the other hand, as with local government
generally, local power in election administration is fragile and can be stripped
away by hostile state-level forces. Moreover, the importance of the local role in
elections, as revealed in 2020, has triggered new and troubling ideological
campaigns to intimidate LEOs and enable antidemocratic forces to take over
local election administration.

15. See, e.g., Dominique Erney, Anne Glatz, Eliza Sweren-Becker & Wendy R. Weiser, Mail
Voting: What Has Changed in 2020, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Sept. 17, 2020), https://www.
brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/mail-voting-what-has-changed-2020 [https://perma.cc/
GGV6-YL3D].
16. Although few in number, the populous metropolitan voting districts have an outsized
importance to the American electorate. See David C. Kimball & Brady Baybeck, Are All Jurisdictions
Equal? Size Disparity in Election Administration, 12 ELECTION L.J. 130, 130–31 (2013) (“[L]ess than six
percent of the local election officials in the United States serve more than two-thirds of the voters in a
national election.”).
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I. THE LOCAL ROLE IN ELECTION ADMINISTRATION: AN OVERVIEW
“The question of who runs elections is critical because elections are the
ultimate accountability mechanism in a democracy.”17 It says something about
the United States that administration of our elections—including elections for
federal office—has long been and continues to be highly decentralized, with
local governments playing the leading operational role.18 Fundamental election
law decisions—such as registration and voter identification requirements, or
authorization of early in-person voting or vote-by-mail—are made by the states,
but the actual conduct of elections is handled almost entirely by local
governments.19 Local officials register voters, process absentee ballot
applications, and distribute and collect absentee ballots.20 They also design
ballots; recruit and train poll workers; manage early voting and Election Day
operations; select and prepare vote centers and polling places; acquire, operate,
maintain, test, and secure voting equipment; and count, canvass, and report the
results.21 In short, they “are responsible for every aspect of the process in the
electoral cycle.”22
The local government that usually conducts elections is the county,
although in some states both counties and municipalities run elections, and
states in New England use their cities and towns.23 Regardless of the type of
jurisdiction, the structure of local election administration typically takes one of
three forms. First, and most common, a single official may be in charge of
administering elections. This is the practice for all or most elections in twentytwo states.24 The local elections office goes by a variety of names—clerk,
auditor, registrar, or supervisor of elections.25 As these titles suggest, in many
places, particularly small- and medium-sized jurisdictions, running elections is
just one of a number of functions for which the office is responsible. The heads
of most single-person election offices are elected, but in at least eight states
some are appointed by the county governing body or manager.26
17. KATHLEEN HALE, ROBERT MONTJOY & MITCHELL BROWN, ADMINISTERING
ELECTIONS: HOW AMERICAN ELECTIONS WORK 27 (2015).
18. KAREN L. SHANTON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45549, THE STATE AND LOCAL ROLE IN
ELECTION ADMINISTRATION: DUTIES AND STRUCTURES 1 (2019).
19. Id. at 3. The principal exceptions are Alaska, where the state conducts elections above the
borough level, and Delaware, where all elections are conducted by the state. Id. at 7.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Marian K. Schneider, Election Security: Increasing Election Integrity by Improving Cybersecurity,
in THE FUTURE OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION: CASES AND CONVERSATIONS 243, 245 (Mitchell
Brown, Kathleen Hale & Bridgett A. King eds., 2019) [hereinafter THE FUTURE OF ELECTION
ADMINISTRATION].
23. HALE ET AL., supra note 17, at 38.
24. Id. at 39–40.
25. Id. at 40.
26. Id. at 40–41.
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Second, elections may be managed by multimember boards or
commissions. This is the practice in about ten states.27 These bodies are typically
bipartisan in nature, with appointments made either at the state level—with
input from local officials or party leaders, by local elected officials, or by a mix
of state and local appointing officers.28 These boards usually employ
professional staff and are headed by an appointed director.29
Third, in eighteen states, the responsibility for election administration is
split across a number of offices—some consisting of individuals, others
multimember boards—with different offices handling different functions, such
as voter registration, Election Day operations, or the canvass of the results.30
These LEOs may be elected or appointed.31
With respect to all these features—single officer or multimember body,
elected or appointed, election functions in a single office or split up—there may
very well be variation within a single state as well as across states. In most states,
the state government or state officials do not appoint and cannot remove
LEOs.32 Women account for more than 75% of LEOs, a number that reflects
the relatively high level of representation of women in municipal and county
clerk offices compared to other levels of government.33
Local governments typically bear most of the costs of elections, including
elections for federal and state offices.34 Before 2020, the only significant federal
funding for state and local election administration was the $3.65 billion made
available to the states pursuant to the Help America Vote Act (“HAVA”) of
2002 to upgrade voting machinery and improve voter registration systems, with
the states committed to providing matching funds as a condition for the HAVA
grants.35 The federal funds were all appropriated more than a decade ago, except
for an additional $380 million provided in March 2018 for election security.36

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id. at 40–42.
Id. at 41–42.
Id.
See id. at 42.
Id. at 33.
NATALIE ADONA, PAUL GRONKE, PAUL MANSON & SARAH COLE, DEMOCRACY FUND,
STEWARDS OF DEMOCRACY: THE VIEWS OF AMERICAN LOCAL ELECTION OFFICIALS 14 (2019),
https://democracyfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/2019_DemocracyFund_StewardsOfDemocr
acy.pdf [https://perma.cc/FQ3V-WUY6].
34. See SHANTON, supra note 18, at 9; GRACE GORDON, CAL. VOTER FOUND., DOCUMENTING
AND ADDRESSING HARASSMENT OF ELECTION OFFICIALS 10 (2021), https://www.calvoter.org/
sites/default/files/cvf_addressing_harassment_of_election_officials_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9
KK-SDZ7].
35. See HALE ET AL., supra note 17, at 85; SHANTON, supra note 18, at 18–19; see also Help
America Vote Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5, 10, 36, 42 and 52 U.S.C.).
36. SHANTON, supra note 18, at 9.
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Beyond the HAVA funds, “[l]ocalities typically assume primary
responsibility” for most of the costs of conducting federal and state elections,
“with states contributing to varying degrees.”37 The most common form of state
support is to cover all or part of the costs of acquiring voting equipment, but
twenty-four states provide no financial assistance even for acquiring voting
equipment.38 Twenty states contribute to the costs of operating and maintaining
voting equipment, and a few states cover or contribute to the costs of training
local officials or share some election-specific costs, like printing ballots and
transporting voting equipment.39 Local governments incur significant electionrelated costs, often with little or no state support, for maintaining, updating,
and securing voting equipment and registered voter databases, as well as for
obtaining supplies long before balloting begins.40 The costs of continuing
software updates “are usually absorbed by cash-strapped local election
jurisdictions.”41 So, too, in most states, personnel costs are borne by local
governments.42 As one federal district court explained in rejecting a private
group’s effort to bar Minneapolis from accepting a nonprofit donation to help
fund the many extra expenses it incurred to conduct the 2020 election, the city
had received no federal or state funds to defray the cost of the 2016 election and
“the City’s responsibility to self-fund federal elections within its boundaries is
typical.”43
Since the eighteenth century, American elections have largely been locally
managed. For much of that time “[e]lection administration was an intermittent
chore for various local officials whose primary responsibilities were in other
functions of government.”44 As elections became more administratively
complex in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, local offices expanded and
in the larger urban centers came to specialize exclusively on elections.45
Local election administration has been far from unproblematic. LEOs in
the South played a key role in enforcing racial exclusion during the Jim Crow
era, and many big-city election offices have been staffed through patronage and
operated to support the interests of local party machines. Nor are these concerns
37. Id.
38. Id. at 10.
39. Id. at 10–11; see also NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, THE PRICE OF DEMOCRACY:
SPLITTING THE BILL FOR ELECTIONS 9–13, 20–23 (2018), https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Docu
ments/Elections/Final_Costs_Report-Splitting_the_Bill_for_Elections_32084.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V98M-ZGF6].
40. See, e.g., Martha Kropf & JoEllen V. Pope, Election Costs: A Study of North Carolina, in THE
FUTURE OF ELECTION ADMINISTRATION, supra note 22, at 185, 188–91.
41. HALE ET AL., supra note 17, at 147.
42. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 39, at 21.
43. Minn. Voters All. v. City of Minneapolis, No. 20-2049, 2020 WL 6119937, at *1 (D. Minn.
Oct. 16, 2020).
44. HALE ET AL., supra note 17, at 30.
45. Id. at 31.
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purely historic, as some local governments have continued to try to dilute
minority votes through the drawing of precinct lines,46 siting polling places in
inconvenient locations, not hiring poll workers of color,47 or burdening the
enforcement of federal voting law protections.48 Before the Supreme Court in
Shelby County v. Holder49 eliminated the requirement that changes in voting
laws, practices, and procedures for certain “covered jurisdictions” be precleared
by the Department of Justice, “the bulk of the Department of Justice’s section
5 objections were against counties and local governments, not states.”50 The
lengthy wrangle over counting Florida’s votes in the 2000 presidential
election—with the LEO-designed “butterfly ballot”51 and the inconsistent
intercounty and intracounty treatment of the “intent of the voter” standard for
assessing disputed ballots52—dramatically made the entire country aware of
some of the shortcomings of local election administration. That election, in
turn, contributed to the enactment of HAVA, which strengthened the role of
the states in election administration, particularly voter registration and the
selection and acquisition of voting machinery.53
“The power and discretion wielded by local staff has been trimmed by
state and federal law since 2000, but local authority remains substantial.”54 The
increased sophistication of voting technology; changes in voter registration
practices; requirements concerning the maintenance of voter databases; the
spread of new means of voting such as early in-person voting and all-mail
elections; the development of new forms of voting, like ranked-choice voting;
and the steady stream of new election laws in both red and blue states have all
further heightened the importance of election administrators, particularly at the
local level, in making the system work.
Although local election administration has, appropriately, been subject to
considerable criticism, political scientist Alec Ewald has shown that “[l]ocal
administration of U.S. elections has sometimes been a vector of inclusion in
46. See, e.g., Sydnee Fielkow, Shelby County and Local Governments: A Case Study of Local Texas
Governments Diluting Minority Votes, 14 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 348, 373–74 (2019).
47. See, e.g., Harris v. Siegelman, 700 F. Supp. 1083, 1085 (M.D. Ala. 1988).
48. See, e.g., Justin Weinstein-Tull, A Localist Critique of Shelby County v. Holder, 11 STAN.
J.C.R. & C.L. 291, 311 (2015) [hereinafter Weinstein-Tull, A Localist Critique].
49. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
50. Weinstein-Tull, A Localist Critique, supra note 48, at 294, 294 n.15.
51. For a sympathetic treatment of the state election law changes and administrative restrictions
that led Palm Beach County Supervisor of Elections Theresa LePore to design the butterfly ballot, see
HALE ET AL., supra note 17, at xxiv–xxv.
52. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105–06 (2000).
53. See, e.g., HALE ET AL., supra note 17, at 83–90.
54. EWALD, supra note 5, at 2. For a trenchant examination of how the continued state
decentralization of most aspects of election administration to local elections offices can be an obstacle
to the enforcement of federal election laws, see generally Justin Weinstein-Tull, Election Law
Federalism, 114 MICH. L. REV. 747 (2016) [hereinafter Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism].
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American voting, a pathway along which the franchise expanded.”55
Historically, some local governments reduced or eliminated property ownership
or tax payment requirements for voting before their states did, and some local
governments extended the suffrage to women before either their state
governments or the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment.56 Although
their power to determine the qualifications for the vote was limited to local
elections, local administrative actions often had the effect of extending the
franchise more broadly. With property assessed and compliance with property
ownership requirements determined at the local level in late eighteenth and
early nineteenth-century America, local officials often enfranchised residents
ineligible under state law. “Inclusionary local practices acted as a kind of
solvent, working hand in hand with changing ideological views to undercut the
property qualification.”57 Then, as now, much of the pressure to loosen state
requirements came in urban areas.58 Some local governments continue to take
the lead by extending the vote to noncitizens or people under eighteen and by
implementing new methods of aggregating votes, such as ranked-choice voting,
although these innovations are necessarily limited to elections for local office.59
In recent years, although formally subservient to their states, some county
election officials resisted state purge laws60 and state-directed cutbacks in early
voting61 and took a relatively lenient approach to the enforcement of stateenacted voter ID requirements.62 Sometimes LEO efforts to extend the
opportunity to vote early put effective pressure on state officials to extend early
voting statewide.63 Even before the pandemic, populous metropolitan-area
counties, facing the greatest stress at their Election Day polling places,
55.
56.
57.
58.

EWALD, supra note 5, at 129.
HALE ET AL., supra note 17, at 129–35.
EWALD, supra note 5, at 131.
See ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 17 (rev. ed. 2009).
59. See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 1, at 1054–66.
60. “Purge” laws are state laws that remove voters from voter registration lists on the theory that
the voter has become ineligible to vote. Most commonly, this involves a determination that the voter
no longer resides at the address at which she or he is registered. Nonresidence, in turn, is most
commonly presumed from the voter’s failure to vote in recent elections, followed by the voter’s failure
to respond to a postcard from the local elections office seeking to determine whether the voter still
resides at the address. Aggressive purge laws disenfranchise relatively inactive voters. See EWALD,
supra note 5, at 7. In Husted v. A. Philip Randolph Institute, 138 S. Ct. 1833 (2018), the Supreme Court
sustained an Ohio purge law that removed from the voter registration list a voter who had failed to
vote for two years and then failed to return to the local elections office a preaddressed, postage-paid
return card, asking the voter to verify the voter still lived at that address. Id. at 1835–37.
61. Weinstein-Tull, A Localist Critique, supra note 48, at 301–03.
62. Id.; see also Louis Cholden-Brown, Local Poll Site, National Implications, 13 ELON L. REV. 109,
131–32 (2020) (“Localities have also filed amicus briefs seeking to preserve the VRA, through
delineation of their experiences . . . .”).
63. See Richard L. Hasen, When Is Uniformity of People, Not Counties, Appropriate in Election
Administration? The Cases of Early and Sunday Voting, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 193, 201.
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supported the availability of early voting and other alternatives to Election Day
voting. But the potential for LEOs to contribute to the advancement of
democracy was most clearly demonstrated by their administration of the
pandemic election of 2020, which is the focus of the next part.
II. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION LOCALISM: IN ACTION AND IN COURT IN
THE ELECTION OF 2020
A.

The Challenge

The COVID-19 pandemic presented an extraordinary challenge for
running an election, especially one as freighted and tumultuous as the 2020
presidential election. The first and most salient public health responses to the
pandemic were “social distancing” and “stay-at-home” directives—measures
that were in strong tension with Election Day voting, particularly in oftencrowded urban polling places. Election Day voting requires an army of poll
workers—over 900,000 worked at 116,000 polling sites in 2016.64 Even in that
prepandemic election, nearly 65% of local election officials surveyed reported
that it was “very difficult” or “somewhat difficult” to obtain poll workers. In
2016, a majority of poll workers were over the age of sixty, and 24% were
seventy-one years or older. With older people most subject to the ravages of
the pandemic, the usual problem of recruiting a sufficient number of poll
workers was magnified severalfold in 2020. Indeed, in the Wisconsin primary—
held in early April just as the pandemic was taking hold—the number of polling
places in Milwaukee was cut from 180 to 5, and in Green Bay from 31 to 2, due
to the absence of poll workers.65 Finding and setting up polling sites for the
November election that met COVID-19 standards of cleanliness and social
distancing, recruiting tens of thousands of new poll workers, and acquiring
personal protective equipment presented “an onslaught of new administrative
challenges.”66
Consequently, crucial to the election administration response to COVID19 was the switch from Election Day polling place voting to the expanded use
of early in-person and mail voting. The percentage of ballots cast on Election
Day dropped from 54.5% in 2016 to just 30.5% in 2020, while the percentage of
ballots cast by mail rose from 24.5% to 43.1%.67 This rapid and unprecedented
64. U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, EAVS DEEP DIVE: POLL WORKERS AND POLLING
PLACES 1 (2017), http://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/document_library/files/EAVSDeepDive_poll
workers_pollingplaces_nov17.pdf [https://perma.cc/EDK7-GAZV].
65. See, e.g., Persily & Stewart, supra note 8, at 4–5, 17–18 (detailing “[the] historic and heroic
administration of the 2020 election”).
66. Introduction to Chapter 3: In-Person Voting, in THE VIRUS AND THE VOTE, supra note 8, at 231,
231.
67. U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N, ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND VOTING
SURVEY 2020 COMPREHENSIVE REPORT 8–10 (2021), https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/docu
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shift presented a host of new challenges. Both early and mail voting had been
on the rise in previous election cycles, but their use had been concentrated in a
limited number of states. Prior to the pandemic, nineteen states—home to more
than 43% of American voters—required an excuse or otherwise limited mail
voting to certain groups.68 By contrast, in 2020, only five states required an
excuse to vote by mail.69 Suddenly, millions of voters who had never before
voted by mail were eligible to do so. Even in those states that had previously
made mail voting broadly available, millions more voters took advantage of that
option in 2020 than had done so before.
The unprecedented surge of tens of millions of voters to a system they had
not previously used placed new burdens on both voters and LEOs. Voting by
mail is more complicated than polling place voting. It entails many more steps.
The voter must apply for a mail ballot; an election office has to verify that the
applicant is eligible for a mail ballot; the election office has to send a ballot to
the voter; the voter has to return the ballot in a timely fashion; and the elections
office has to “process” and verify the ballot.70
Unlike the traditional experience of voting at a physical polling place
under the supervision of election officials or volunteer election workers,
marking an absentee/mailed ballot occurs in an unsupervised
environment, usually at the voter’s home. The ballot is then sent through
the mail or delivered in person to the election office. Because the voter
does not appear in person, election officials use other ways of verifying
that the absentee/mailed ballot they are receiving comes from the
intended eligible voter.71
Typically, this involves signature verification, or requiring the voter to sign an
affidavit on the ballot’s return envelope, which is then checked against the
voter’s signature on file in the elections office. This can cause problems if the
voter fails to sign the ballot or there is a discrepancy between the ballot
signature and the one on file. Some states require mail voters to include
photocopies of their identification documents or have the mailed ballot
envelope signed by witnesses or notarized.72 The voter’s failure to do this, or to
take other steps required to assure that the ballot has been properly completed
ment_library/files/2020_EAVS_Report_Final_508c.pdf [https://perma.cc/7G9A-68VV]. Early inperson voting also rose, albeit less dramatically than mail-in voting, from 25.3% to 30.6%. Id.
68. See, e.g., How Common Was By-Mail Voting Before COVID-19 and Which States Will Allow It in
2020?, USAFACTS, https://usafacts.org/articles/voting-by-mail-and-covid-19/ [https://perma.cc/LKM
5-JB55] (Sept. 29, 2020, 1:24 PM).
69. Id.
70. See Voting Outside the Polling Place: Absentee, All-Mail, and Other Voting at Home Options, NAT’L
CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/
absentee-and-early-voting.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZPR8-S73G].
71. Id.
72. Id.
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and returned, can cause problems for both the voter and voting officials. There
is generally a higher voter error rate for mail-in ballots than polling place
ballots, with new mail-in voters especially prone to error.73 For the LEOs there
is the expense of new supplies and equipment to print, fold, mail, unfold, and
tabulate the ballots. The whole system depends on a postal service whose
reliability many voters came to doubt.
B.

The Response

In 2020, many local election administrators, particularly in major urban
centers, proved to be resilient, innovative, and attentive to local circumstances
and concerns. They addressed the problems of both pandemic in-person voting
and the transition to an unprecedented volume of mail-in voting.
1. In-Person Voting
For in-person voting, this involved massive investment in hygiene and
safety in traditional polling places and the expansion of voting hours and voting
centers to address social distancing concerns. City and county election offices
gave voters greater choices as to where to vote and found new types of voting
locations, like outdoor tents, sports arenas, parks, fairgrounds, and convention
centers.74 LEOs also enjoyed extraordinary success in recruiting tens of
thousands of new and younger poll workers to replace the older workers most
at risk from COVID-19.75 LEOs engaged in extensive outreach to local
73. See Nathaniel Rakich, Why Rejected Ballots Could Be a Big Problem in 2020, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Oct. 13, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-rejected-ballots-could-be-a-bigproblem-in-2020/ [https://perma.cc/W6K6-K5EQ].
74. See Lisa Keen, The 2020 Primary Elections, in THE VIRUS AND THE VOTE, supra note 8, at 28,
44 (discussing how Fulton County, Georgia, partnered with the Atlanta Hawks to use Atlanta’s State
Farm Arena); Mathew Simkovits, Michigan 2020: Election Administration in the Coronavirus Pandemic,
in THE VIRUS AND THE VOTE, supra note 8, at 80, 93–94 (discussing how Michigan used the Henry
Ford Detroit Pistons Performance Center as a satellite voting center and the Detroit Lions’ Ford Field
as a place to receive ballots); Craig Mauger, Detroit, Michigan Secretary of State Partner To Ensure Integrity
of November Election, DETROIT NEWS, https://www.detroitnews.com/story/news/politics/2020/09/
02/detroit-sos-jocelyn-benson-partner-november-election/5689364002/ [https://perma.cc/Z4F5-PR
WV] (Sept. 2, 2020, 10:07 AM) (explaining that the Detroit Red Wings, Tigers, Pistons, and Lions
will work with Detroit officials to use their arenas to support election administration); Audrey Conklin,
Drive-Thru Voting, Ballot Drop-Offs Pop Up in Minnesota, Texas, Other States, FOX NEWS (Oct. 4, 2020),
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/drive-thru-voting-ballot-drop-offs [https://perma.cc/7RXY-MVG
H] (discussing the use of the Oakland-Alameda County, California, Coliseum for in-person voting);
Carrie Levine & Matt Vasilogambros, Running an Election in a Pandemic, in 10 Steps, CTR. FOR PUB.
INTEGRITY (Sept. 9, 2020), https://publicintegrity.org/politics/elections/ballotboxbarriers/runningelection-lessons-pandemic-10-steps/ [https://perma.cc/9952-F7XE] (explaining that St. Louis County
told voters they could go to any polling place in the county, not just the one to they which they were
assigned; poll workers would print the correct ballot on demand; this was expected to cut polling
locations by one-third; and “voters who face lines can change locations”).
75. Evie Freeman, Jacob McCall, Maia Brockbank & Anastasiia Malenko, Poll Worker Recruitment
in the 2020 General Election, in THE VIRUS AND THE VOTE, supra note 8, at 261, 261–77; Barbara
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businesses, nonprofits, civic groups, schools, and universities. In some
instances, they persuaded local organizations to sponsor a polling place by
providing workers or collaborated with their local government to have local
public servants assigned to the polls.76 Some increased compensation or offered
other incentives.77
This extensive array of in-person voting measures largely involved the
exercise of preexisting local discretionary authority. These actions underscore
the local capacity for taking the initiative, as well as the advantage decentralized
administration offers in terms of easier connections and ability to work with
local businesses, civil society organizations, and community groups in locating
and obtaining access to voting sites, securing the donation of supplies, recruiting
volunteer workers, and successfully seeking additional funding. As one close
study of the 2020 election in Michigan concluded, “Michigan’s decentralized
election system itself may have contributed to the efficiency of in-person voting
in the 2020 general election, as the system allowed town clerks to tailor the
location and procedures of polling places to the unique needs of their own
counties.”78
This herculean effort to obtain new polling places, furnish them with
equipment and supplies, make them safe and secure, hire new workers, and
provide staff with personal protective equipment imposed major financial
burdens on many traditionally underfunded election offices. The federal
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES Act”) provided
states with $400 million to address the consequences of the pandemic for the
election—a sum many elections officials concluded was not nearly enough to
meet the need.79 Much of the gap was closed by an additional $400 million in
Sprunt, Poll Worker Numbers Have Many Election Officials Breathing Sigh of Relief, WABE (Oct. 29, 2020),
https://www.wabe.org/on-poll-workers-many-election-officials-breathe-sigh-of-relief/ [https://perma.
cc/JH44-4RYX].
76. See Amanda Zerbe, Florida 2020: Election Administration in the Coronavirus Pandemic, in THE
VIRUS AND THE VOTE, supra note 8, at 56, 70; Simkovits, supra note 74, at 91; Mikaela Pyatt, Alexa
Gold & Krithika Iyer, Nevada 2020: Election Administration in the Coronavirus Pandemic, in THE VIRUS
AND THE VOTE, supra note 8, at 103, 111; Haley Schwab & Joven Hundal, Arizona 2020: Election
Administration in the Coronavirus Pandemic, in THE VIRUS AND THE VOTE, supra note 8, at 176, 181.
77. See Zerbe, supra note 76, at 70 (mentioning supplemental financial incentives offered poll
workers in Palm Beach County, Florida); Simkovits, supra note 74, at 91 (discussing how Detroit,
Michigan, increased poll worker pay from $175 to $500 per day); Pyatt et al., supra note 76, at 111
(detailing that some counties in Nevada increased hourly pay to attract poll workers); Bree Baccaglini,
Georgia 2020: Election Administration in the Coronavirus Pandemic, in THE VIRUS AND THE VOTE, supra
note 8, at 201, 207 (discussing how some counties in Georgia experimented with hazard pay to increase
recruitment).
78. Simkovits, supra note 74, at 93.
79. Pub. L. No. 116-136, tit. V, 134 Stat. 281, 530 (2020) (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.); see also Maggie Miller, State and Local Officials Beg Congress To Send More Election Funds Ahead
of November, HILL (July 8, 2020, 5:31 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/506464-state-andlocal-officials-beg-congress-to-send-more-election-funds-ahead [https://perma.cc/JH44-4RYX].
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grants directly to 2,500 local elections offices by the Center for Tech and Civic
Life (“CTCL”), which was funded significantly by Priscilla Chan and Mark
Zuckerberg. These grants proved to be a lightning rod for litigation and
legislative attack.80 But apart from the CTCL grants, LEOs acted largely within
the traditional scope of their authority, albeit with considerably more initiative
than skeptics might have anticipated.
2. Mail Voting
LEO efforts to make mail voting more accessible and attractive to voters
were, if anything, more innovative and attentive to local circumstances and
concerns, and, judging by the enormous shift to mail voting, even more
successful. As already indicated, mail voting is far more complicated and
uncertain for both voters and clerks. It entails many more steps, the filling out
of more forms, checking of more boxes, and signing on more lines than inperson voting, with the timely mailing of ballots by and back to local election
offices subject to the vagaries of the postal service. The massive shift to voteby-mail entailed significant costs in terms of the need to educate voters and to
obtain the equipment needed to print, mail, and tabulate the mail ballots. Here,
too, CTCL grants were critical to LEO success.
LEOs took the initiative to make mail-in voting more easily available to
and usable by voters in at least four different ways. First, as discussed later in
this section, some sought to expand eligibility to vote by mail by arguing for
expansive interpretations of the state laws limiting eligibility. Second, and more
commonly, many sought to expand the availability of mail-in voting by sending
mail-ballot applications, or mail ballots, to voters before receiving requests.81
Third, some sought to address the voter error problem by increasing educational
outreach to voters, taking administrative actions that reduced the likelihood of
errors, and seeking or adopting interpretations of state laws that rendered the
80. Multiple lawsuits were filed around the country by political groups—mostly with the term
“voters alliance” in their name—to bar local elections offices from accepting or using CTCL grants. All
were rejected. See, e.g., Wis. Voters All. v. City of Racine, No 20-CV-01487, 2020 WL 9254456 (E.D.
Wis. Nov. 6, 2020); Ga. Voter All. v. Fulton County, 499 F. Supp. 3d 1250 (N.D. Ga. 2020); Pa.
Voters All. v. Centre County, 496 F. Supp. 3d 861 (M.D. Pa. 2020); Minn. Voters All. v. City of
Minneapolis, No. 20-2049, 2020 WL 6119937 (D. Minn. Oct. 16, 2020); Tex. Voters All. v. Dallas
County, 495 F. Supp. 3d 441 (E.D. Tex. 2020); Iowa Voter All. v. Black Hawk County, No. C202078, 2020 WL 6151559 (D. Iowa Oct. 20, 2020); Election Integrity Fund v. City of Lansing, No. 20cv-950, 2020 WL 6605987 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 19, 2020).
81. See, e.g., Elise Viebeck, Mailing of Ballots to All Voters in Las Vegas Area Puts Sharp Focus on
Election Safeguards, WASH. POST (May 29, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/mailingof-ballots-to-all-voters-in-las-vegas-area-puts-sharp-focus-on-election-safeguards/2020/05/28/912c099
a-9f63-11ea-b5c9-570a91917d8d_story.html [https://perma.cc/3ZTS-G9NG (dark archive)]. The
Nevada Secretary of State said she would send absentee ballots for the state’s June 9 primary to all
active voters. Id. The Registrar of Voters in Clark County (the state’s most populous county and the
home of Las Vegas) said he would go beyond the state’s plan by sending ballots to inactive as well as
active registered voters. Id.
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errors harmless.82 Fourth, LEOs around the country sought to address voter
anxieties about the uncertain performance of the postal service by adopting new
ways, or dramatically expanding old ways, for voters to return their ballots
directly to elections offices without having to use the mail. This involved
holding community events—like “Democracy in the Park”83 in Madison,
Wisconsin—at which ballots could be collected; sending mobile voting units—
like Philadelphia’s “Voteswagon”84—to libraries and other community locations
to collect ballots; the use of drive-in, drive-through, and curbside voting by
which motorists could return their ballots to early voting centers and election
offices; and the expanded use of drop boxes at locations throughout the city or
county.85
Some of these LEO actions to make mail-in voting more available were
legally unproblematic and simply highlighted the creative ability of LEOs to
use their traditional powers to acquire technology, organize balloting, undertake
voter information campaigns, sponsor community events, and manage their
offices, albeit under difficult circumstances. Even without the use of legally
uncertain measures, LEOs in North Carolina conducted elections with recordbreaking turnout and the lowest mail ballot rejection rate in recent elections.86
A study found that “[a]ccomplishing these feats required local election officials
to adapt their processes in order to receive, count, and tabulate a five-fold
increase in mail votes.”87
Other actions raised significant legal issues, with LEOs pushing—or
breaking through—the envelope of their administrative authority. Local efforts
to get ballots to voters, facilitate error correction, or expand the use of drop
boxes88 were often more than arguably inconsistent with state law or
administrative directives. To achieve their goals of vindicating the right to vote,
82. Examples of these efforts include the decision of the Maricopa County Recorder to make it
easier for voters to correct their ballots in a manner not authorized by and arguably inconsistent with
state law, see infra notes 92–97 and accompanying text, as well as the “prefilling” of voter information
in absentee ballot applications by the county recorders in several Iowa counties, see infra notes 127–41
and accompanying text.
83. See JT Cestkowski, City of Madison Stands by ‘Democracy in the Park’ Despite Letter from
Republicans, WKOW.COM (Oct. 1, 2020), https://www.wkow.com/news/politics/city-of-madisonstands-by-democracy-in-the-park-despite-letter-from-republicans/article_531e606c-b418-55d7-b68f-3
88a89a2db0b.html [https://perma.cc/H6S3-39YV].
84. See, e.g., Dan Koob, Philadelphia Sends Out ‘Voteswagon’ To Collect Mail-In Ballots, CBS PHILLY
(May 30, 2020, 10:55 PM), https://philadelphia.cbslocal.com/2020/05/30/philadelphia-sends-outvoteswagon-to-collect-mail-in-ballots/ [https://perma.cc/YW2C-GP4T].
85. See, e.g., Conklin, supra note 74.
86. See Christopher Middleton, North Carolina 2020: Election Administration in the Coronavirus
Pandemic, in THE VIRUS AND THE VOTE, supra note 8, at 117, 134.
87. Id.
88. Only eight states explicitly permitted the use of drop boxes, although they had been available
in some counties in at least nineteen states even before 2020. See Axel Hufford, Ballot Drop Boxes in the
2020 Elections, in THE VIRUS AND THE VOTE, supra note 8, at 354, 356–57.
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some LEOs appealed to their states to change the relevant voting laws.89
Sometimes state and local officials worked together to promote ballot access.90
Others sued their state or supported or joined lawsuits brought by civic or
political groups seeking to expand ballot access.91
But, as discussed more fully in the next section, in several instances state
officials—governors, attorneys generals, and secretaries of state (the chief state
elections officer in most states)—pushed back hard, suing to block these voterfriendly initiatives. Local officials lost these suits far more often than not, but
taken together the cases illustrate both the willingness of local officials to go to
bat for the voting rights of their constituents, and the unwillingness of the
courts, even as they recognized the key operational role of local election
administrators, to allow local administrators to pursue policies opposed by their
states.
C.

LEOs in Court

This section examines the principal litigations in four states—Arizona,
Iowa, Ohio, and Texas—that together addressed the range of means local
election offices sought to use to advance mail voting—eligibility, availability,
error prevention and correction, and ballot return. It is organized by state,
rather than by issue, because the focus here is not on the issues per se but on
the nature and scope of local efforts and the judicial response to state-local
conflict in this area.

89. See, e.g., Axel Hufford & Sarah Maung, Pennsylvania 2020: Election Administration in the
Coronavirus Pandemic, in THE VIRUS AND THE VOTE, supra note 8, at 135, 143 (describing the
Philadelphia City Commissioner’s appeal to the state legislature by mail to take immediate action to
undo a state court decision concluding that mail ballots returned without “secrecy sleeves” had to be
rejected).
90. See, e.g., Pa. Democratic Party v. Boockvar, 238 A.3d 345, 354 n.9 (Pa. 2020) (describing how
four county election boards joined the Pennsylvania Secretary of State in seeking a resolution of the
question of their authority to establish temporary ballot collection sites and to discount certain voter
errors in the completion of absentee ballots); Fontes v. State, No. CV 2020-011845, 2020 WL 6498932,
at *1 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Oct. 6, 2020) (order denying claim for declaratory, injunctive, and special action
relief) (demonstrating that the Arizona Secretary of State and Maricopa County Recorder together
supported a contested interpretation of state law); cf. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. v. Pate,
950 N.W.2d 1, 2–3 (Iowa 2020) (per curiam) (ordering the Iowa Secretary of State to authorize mailing
of absentee ballot applications to all voters but rejecting other county actions to facilitate the
completion of mail ballot applications, following an initiative taken by three Iowa counties).
91. See, e.g., Ohio Democratic Party v. LaRose, No. 20CV-5634, 2020 WL 5637174, at *1 (Ohio
Ct. Com. Pl. Sept. 15, 2020) (“This case concerns how voters may return absentee ballots for the
November 3, 2020, general election, and specifically the possible use of multiple ballot ‘drop boxes’ in
each county to which Ohio voters might return their absentee ballots if they elect not to rely upon the
U.S. Mail.”); In re State, 602 S.W.3d 549, 550 (Tex. 2020) (“In this original proceeding, amidst the
COVID-19 pandemic, and with elections upcoming in July and November, the parties ask us to
determine whether a voter’s lack of immunity from the disease and concern about contracting it at a
polling place is a ‘disability’ within the meaning of the statute.”).
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1. Arizona
Between March and October 2020, Adrian Fontes—the Recorder for
Maricopa County, Arizona’s most populous county (the fourth most populous
county in the United States and the home of Phoenix, the state’s largest city)—
undertook several controversial initiatives to make it easier for his constituents
to vote by mail. These were challenged in three lawsuits brought by state
officials or a hostile political organization.92
Fontes first sought to facilitate the availability of absentee ballots. On
March 13, 2020, with the COVID-19 pandemic rapidly emerging as a national
crisis and the state’s presidential primary just four days away, Fontes announced
he would mail ballots and a postage-paid return envelope to every registered
voter in the county. As he explained, “We’re doing this . . . to make sure that
every eligible voter can safely fill out a ballot, put it in the envelope and
maintain appropriate social distance by just popping in and dropping it off at
any of the polling locations that will be open on Tuesday.”93 Arizona law
provided for the mailing of ballots to all voters who had asked to be placed on
the state’s “permanent early voting list,”94 but in sending ballots to all registered
voters in the county, Fontes went beyond state law. Fontes acknowledged this,
but did not see it as a fatal obstacle: “There is no explicit authority in law for
this and there’s also no prohibition in law.”95
This was not the first time the County Recorder had treated state election
law as a floor and not a ceiling on local efforts to facilitate voting.96 In 2018, he
opened up five “emergency voting centers” in the period between the end of
early voting and Election Day to enable voters to cast their ballots if, as state
law provided, they anticipated that due to “unforeseen circumstances” they
would be unable to vote on Election Day. When some Republicans asserted
92. Dillon Rosenblatt, Court Stops County Recorder from Sending Ballots to All Voters for Tuesday
Election, ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES (Mar. 13, 2020), https://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2020/03/13/courtstops-county-recorder-from-sending-ballots-to-all-voters-for-tuesday-election/ [https://perma.cc/DR2
W-LZWJ].
93. Id.
94. At the time of the litigation, Arizona election law provided for a “permanent early voting
list,” ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-544 (2020). In 2021, the law was amended to provide only for an
“active early voting list.” Act of May 11, 2021, ch. 359, 2021 Ariz. Legis. Serv. (West) (codified at
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-544 (2021)). Unlike under the pre-2021 law, an Arizona voter who has
not voted early in all elections in the two previous consecutive election cycles will be removed from
the early voting list. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-544H(4) (Westlaw through the 1st Spec. Sess.
of the 55th Leg. and 1st Reg. Sess. of the 55th Leg.). The law on the books in the 2020 election had no
such restriction.
95. Rosenblatt, supra note 92 (quoting Adrian Fontes).
96. For a general discussion of the role of floors versus ceilings in state-local conflicts, see
RICHARD BRIFFAULT, NESTOR M. DAVIDSON & LAURIE REYNOLDS, THE NEW PREEMPTION
READER: LEGISLATION, CASES, AND COMMENTARY ON THE LEADING CHALLENGE IN TODAY’S
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 8–9 (2019) [hereinafter BRIFFAULT ET AL., THE NEW
PREEMPTION READER].
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Fontes’s interpretation of “unforeseen circumstances” was more liberal than the
law intended, he defended his action, saying, “The intent of the law is to make
sure people who want to vote can vote . . . . All I’m trying to do is let people
vote.”97
Although Fontes was able to implement this action to facilitate voting in
2018,98 his 2020 effort in response to COVID-19 was immediately blocked by
Arizona’s Republican Attorney General who obtained an injunction premised
on the theory that the Arizona law authorizing the county recorder to mail
ballots to electors who “make a verbal or signed request to the county recorder”
by eleven days before the election99 was a ceiling, not a floor, that prohibited
the Recorder from sending a ballot to anyone who had not requested one.100 The
Maricopa County Superior Court agreed and enjoined Fontes’s action.101
A second Maricopa action sought to ameliorate the consequences of voter
error. For both the March 2020 presidential preference primary and the August
primary, the Recorder included with the mailed ballot an instruction that if the
voter makes a mistake in marking a candidate’s name, she can “cross out” the
mistake by drawing a line through the name and the oval marked next to it and
then filling in the oval next to the corrected selection. This differed from the
provision of the state’s Election Procedures Manual that requires the voter to
destroy the ballot and request a new one—a more time-consuming and
uncertain process.102 A group calling itself the Arizona Public Integrity Alliance
sought a preliminary injunction barring Maricopa from including the correction
instruction with mail ballots for the November election.103 The Maricopa
County Superior Court found the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits
of whether the county was required to follow the state rule but nonetheless
denied the injunction.104 The court expressed doubt whether voters would be
97. Jeremy Duda, Republicans Question Fontes Decisions on Emergency Voting Centers, ARIZ. MIRROR
(Nov. 15, 2018, 4:54 PM), http://www.azmirror.com/2018/11/15/republicans-question-fontes-decisions
-on-emergency-voting-centers/ [https://perma.cc/6WF3-3K4T].
98. The Republican state legislature, however, subsequently adopted a new law tightening up on
the ability of voters to use the emergency voting option. See Arizona Law Restricting Emergency Voting
Centers Goes into the Books, KTAR (Apr. 18, 2019, 12:00 PM), https://ktar.com/story/2539074/arizonalaw-restricting-emergency-voting-centers-goes-into-the-books/ [https://perma.cc/E2U9-EARP].
99. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-542(A), (E) (Westlaw through 2021 1st Spec. Sess. of 55th Leg.
and 1st Reg. Sess. of 55th Leg.).
100. Verified Civil Complaint for Declaratory Injunctive, Special Action, and Quo Warranto
Relief at 7, Fontes v. Arizona, No. CV 2020-011845, 2020 WL 6498932, at *7 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Oct.
6, 2020).
101. See Rosenblatt, supra note 92.
102. See Ariz. Pub. Integrity All. v. Fontes, LC2020-000252-001 DT, at *3–4 (Ariz. Super. Ct.
Sept. 4, 2020) (order denying plaintiffs’ application for a preliminary injunction and defendants’
motion to dismiss) (discussing the relevant provision of the Secretary of State’s Election Procedures
Manual).
103. Id. at *1–2.
104. Id. at *5–6.
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harmed by the instruction, noted the logistical difficulty and cost to the county
of printing 2.5 million new instruction sheets in time to meet the statutory
deadlines for mailing the ballots, and concluded that public policy weighed
against the injunction.105 As the court explained, under Arizona election
procedure, if a voter returned a ballot that indicated two choices, the ballot
would be rejected by the machine reader but given a manual review to
determine the voter’s intent.106 In avoiding the need for the voter to request and
obtain a second ballot, “the County Defendants’ approach is understandable,
and nothing suggests improper motives behind it.”107
The Arizona Supreme Court reversed in an opinion that sharply slapped
down the Recorder and rejected his position that he was vindicating the rights
of Arizona mail-in voters.108 Invoking a trope used by many other state courts
in the 2020 state-local election administration fights, the court emphasized the
importance of statewide rules to maintain “impartiality, uniformity and
efficiency.”109 The court emphasized the public interest in requiring the
Recorder to abide by state law, and the plaintiffs’ “beneficial[] interest[]” in
compelling the Recorder “to perform his legal duty.”110
The Maricopa Recorder’s one litigation success involved advancing a
position taken by the Democratic Secretary of State in the face of opposition
from the Republican Attorney General. Under Arizona law, a voter who cannot
go to the polls due to illness or disability is entitled to vote with the assistance
of a bipartisan two-person special election board.111 The board is required to
deliver the ballot personally to the voter and provide the necessary assistance
in-person.112 But in 2020, “personal contact during the pandemic may entail a
health risk to certain voters, especially those who are elderly or have
compromised immune systems, and especially because the two members of the
special election board will almost always be strangers to the voter.”113 In
response, the Secretary of State issued guidance authorizing county recorders
to develop procedures for special election boards to use video meetings.114
Maricopa developed such a process, which essentially permitted the board to
mark the ballot for the voter. As the Attorney General noted, under this
105. Id. at *6, 8.
106. Id. at *4.
107. Id. at *8.
108. Ariz. Pub. Integrity All. v. Fontes, 475 P.3d 303, 309 (Ariz. 2020).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 309–10. The court also concluded that the instructions could have been replaced in time
to meet the deadlines; it did not consider the cost of doing so. Id. at 310.
111. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-549(C) (Westlaw through 2021 1st Spec. Sess. of 55th Leg. and
1st Reg. Sess. of 55th Leg.).
112. Id.
113. Fontes v. State, 2020 WL 6498932, at *2 (Ariz. Super. Ct. Oct. 5, 2020) (order denying
claims for declaratory, injunctive, and special action relief).
114. Id.
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procedure, the voter would “never touch the ballot, mark it, sign it, or physically
return it.”115 The Recorder, supported by the Secretary of State, brought suit
for a declaration that the video board policy was lawful;116 the Attorney General
counterclaimed, seeking a declaration of invalidity and injunctive relief.117
The Maricopa County Superior Court agreed with the Attorney General
that the County Recorder “has no general authority over the conduct of
elections, only the authority granted by statute.”118 The relevant statute required
the interaction between a special election board and a voter to be “in person”
and that “cannot be construed to mean by video meeting.”119 But the court also
found the Recorder has a “duty” under federal law—“as does everyone involved
in the election process”—to make “reasonable modifications” to state law to
accommodate voters with disabilities.120 When the Attorney General countered
that “it is not the County Recorder’s place to decide what reasonable
modifications must be made,” the court responded by emphasizing that “by
statute, the County Recorder administers special election boards” so it was up
to the Recorder in the first instance to decide whether a special election board
could use the video procedure.121 Consequently, the court denied the Attorney
General any injunctive or declaratory relief.122
2. Iowa
The efforts of county auditors in three Iowa counties—Johnson, Linn, and
Woodbury123—to reduce the likelihood that voters would make mistakes in their
absentee ballot applications and the work LEOs would have to undertake to
correct those errors, culminated in two back-to-back decisions of the Iowa
Supreme Court in mid-October 2020, both rejecting the LEOs’ efforts.
To obtain an absentee ballot, an Iowa voter must submit an application
that includes their name, signature, date of birth, address, and “voter
verification number,” which is either a driver’s license or ID number issued by
the Department of Transportation, or a voter PIN number issued by the
Secretary of State.124 If the application is incomplete—e.g., missing the voter

115. Id. at *3.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at *3–4.
121. Id. at *4.
122. Id. at *6.
123. Their county seats are, respectively, Iowa City (home of the University of Iowa), Cedar
Rapids, and Sioux City. The counties are, respectively, the fourth, second, and sixth most populous in
the state.
124. See Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm. v. Pate, 950 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Iowa 2020) (per
curiam).
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verification number—it will be rejected.125 Many voters misplace the card with
their verification number or make mistakes in completing the form.126 Prior to
2020, to avoid having to contact the voter to get the additional information,
county auditors often “prefilled” applications by including information, such as
the verification number, drawn from the voter registration database.127
Alternatively, if the application was submitted without the information, a
county auditor’s office would complete it (and correct other minor errors) from
public records.128 In June 2020, however, the legislature passed a law eliminating
these options. The new measure expressly required the voter to provide the
necessary information and directed the auditors to contact the voter if there was
a problem with the application or to obtain any information necessary to
complete the application.129
In July 2020, the Johnson, Linn, and Woodbury County Auditors began
mailing absentee ballot applications to all registered voters in their counties—
with prefilled ballot application forms—to facilitate absentee voting and lessen
administrative expenses during the pandemic.130 Thereafter, the Secretary of
State obtained permission from the Iowa Legislative Council to send out
absentee ballot applications statewide but also issued a “directive” to the county
auditors barring them from using prefilled ballot request forms.131 Initially, the
Secretary of State took no action to enforce the directive against the county
auditors, but the Republican National Committee and other Republican
plaintiffs sued the auditors to enjoin the mailing of prefilled applications and to
claw back the forms of the voters who had completed and returned them.132 Iowa
county courts, relying on state law and the Secretary of State’s directive,
concluded the auditors lacked authority to prefill the absentee ballot forms and
granted the Republicans the requested relief.
Several Democratic organizations then brought suit challenging the
Secretary of State’s directive barring prefilling. A county district court granted
a stay against the enforcement of the Secretary of State’s order, finding that the
county auditors’ actions advanced the “public’s interest in maximizing voter
participation in the upcoming general election . . . by making absentee voting
as easy and widely available as possible.”133 The state supreme court reversed
the stay, finding the Secretary of State had acted within the scope of his
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., id. at 11 (Appel, J., specially concurring); League of United Latin Am. Citizens of
Iowa v. Pate, 950 N.W.2d 204, 223–30 (Iowa 2020) (Oxley, J., dissenting).
127. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 950 N.W.2d at 3.
128. See League of United Latin Am. Citizens of Iowa, 950 N.W.2d at 208 (per curiam).
129. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 950 N.W.2d at 9–12 (Appel, J., specially concurring).
130. Id. at 3 (majority opinion).
131. Id. at 2–3.
132. Id. at 3.
133. Id. at 5.
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authority.134 The court also took a swipe at the counties, noting that although
Iowa counties enjoy constitutional home rule authority, the Iowa statute dealing
with the procedure for obtaining an absentee ballot “overrides any home rule
authority of county auditors” and that, “[n]othing in Iowa law restricts the
Secretary of State’s ability to take prompt action when county auditors in
specific counties are not following state election laws.”135
Justice Brent Appel, concurring specially, parted company with the
majority in assessing the practical reasonableness of the LEOs’ actions. As he
explained, there was little ballot security gained—and a burden imposed on
voting rights—by requiring voters to supply the identification information
themselves:
[I]f a voter does not know their voter PIN number, they may contact the
county commissioner of election, who will provide the voter that
information to them if the caller provides two items of identification,
e.g., name, address, or birth date. . . . One wonders why a voter who has
forgotten or misplaced a PIN number may simply obtain it from the
county auditor by providing publically [sic] available information, but
the county auditor cannot send the number to the registered voter at his
voting address on a prefilled absentee ballot request.136
The prefilling issue came before the Iowa Supreme Court again in a direct
attack by a voting rights group on the new statute barring auditors from
correcting defective applications from information within auditors’ records.137
The court found the burden on Iowa voters was neither severe nor
discriminatory and was justified by the standard arguments about fraud and
public confidence in the electoral process.138 The dissent pointed to the burdens
on the county auditors, who were struggling to protect the right to vote. As
Justice Dana Oxley, writing for the three dissenters, put it:
The majority dismisses the record evidence not only about the pandemic
and its effects on county auditors’ ability to keep up with record-breaking
requests for absentee ballots—requests made at the urging of the
defendant [the Secretary of State] that voting by mail is the safest way
to vote—it also dismisses the record evidence about the significant
number of ballot requests county auditors will receive with missing or
incorrect information . . . .139

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 18–19 (Appel, J., specially concurring).
League of United Latin Am. Citizens of Iowa v. Pate, 950 N.W.2d 204, 206–07 (Iowa 2020).
Id. at 209–11.
Id. at 217–18 (Oxley, J., dissenting).
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She explained that “[t]o meet the demands of a record numbers of absentee
ballot requests for the June primary, workers in auditors’ offices statewide
worked overtime and added additional staff. In Scott County, for example, staff
worked fourteen straight twelve-to-fourteen-hour workdays to meet the high
demand for absentee ballots”—and that was under the old Iowa law that allowed
them to correct incomplete or inaccurate information based on voter records in
their database.140 She cited the statement by the president of the Iowa State
Association of County Auditors, issued with the approval of the association’s
executive board, and affidavits submitted by county auditors from three
different counties about the high percentage of absentee ballot applications with
missing or incorrect ID numbers, the efficiency and security of the prior system
of using information in the database to correct errors, and the enormous burdens
on both administrators and voters posed by the new requirement.141 Although
they did not prevail, the county auditors’ statements underscored their on-theground knowledge of the obstacles mail voters face and the LEO efforts to help
voters overcome the hurdles added by the legislature.
3. Ohio
The focus of the litigation in Ohio was drop boxes—secure containers
maintained by county boards of elections as a means for voters, concerned about
the well-publicized delays in mail delivery by the U.S. Postal Service, to return
their mail ballots directly to the elections office. Ohio law was silent on the use
of drop boxes, but prior to 2020 some counties had used them—either inside
the county elections office or as part of a drive-through facility outside the
county office—and some had used them in the June primary.142 With the surge
in mail-in voting, limiting drop boxes to county offices was often inadequate to
handle the demand. During the primary, voters caused major traffic backups
when they lined up in their vehicles to use the single drop boxes at the elections’
offices in urban places like Hamilton (Cincinnati) and Montgomery (Dayton)
Counties.143 For the general election, many counties, particularly larger urban
ones, sought to place multiple drop boxes at satellite locations, such as public
libraries, county agency buildings, or branch offices of the county sheriff. For
example, Franklin County (Columbus) was considering four to five drop box
locations around the county; Mahoning County (Youngstown) planned ten
additional drop boxes at locations other than the board’s office.144 Even in

140. Id. at 219.
141. Id. at 223–30.
142. See Ohio Democratic Party v. LaRose, No. 20CV-5634, 2020 WL 5637174, at *5–7 (Ohio Ct.
Com. Pl. Sept. 15, 2020).
143. Id. at *5–6.
144. Id. at *6.
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smaller, more rural counties, LEOs concerned about the “[s]poradic”145 nature
of local mail service sought to add satellite drop boxes.
On August 12, 2020, the Ohio Secretary of State moved to stop the
counties by issuing Directive 2020-16, which “prohibited [county boards] from
installing a drop box at any location other than the board of elections.”146 Voters
and the Ohio Democratic Party, with five cities and three counties supporting
the plaintiffs as amici, challenged the directive in state court, and another set of
voters and a civil rights group, again with supportive cities and counties as
amici, sued in federal court.147 The plaintiffs initially prevailed in the state court
of common pleas. Relying heavily on the affidavits of the county boards for its
findings of fact and on their general authority to administer elections, the court
concluded that the secretary’s directive was “arbitrary and unreasonable” and
that “every board of elections is legally permitted to consider enhancing safe
and convenient delivery of absentee ballots, and may tailor ballot drop box
locations or conceivably other secure options to the needs of their individual
county.”148 The court specifically rejected the Secretary’s contention that the
one-drop-box-per-county rule promoted equality across the state:
Unless Ohio rearranges its government structure so that every county
has roughly the same population and comparable geographic access to a
drop box and places for voting, there will inevitably be serious
inconvenience caused many voters by such an arbitrary rule. Treating
one drop box per county as “equal” is equivalent to arguing that every
county needs only 100 (or some other arbitrary number) of voting
machines, regardless of the population. That view of “equal” treatment
is nonsense.149
The court of appeals reversed. It rejected the Secretary of State’s argument
that Ohio law—which calls for the voter casting an absentee ballot to either mail
the ballot to the county director of elections or to “personally deliver it to the
director”150—requires that delivery must occur only at the office of the county
board of elections.151 But the court concluded that the Secretary’s directive did
not violate the absentee ballot law and that nothing in Ohio law precluded the
directive.152
The federal litigation followed a similar path. The district court initially
enjoined the Secretary’s directive; the Sixth Circuit then stayed the injunction
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *18.
Id. at *16.
OHIO REV. CODE § 3509.05(A) (2022).
See Ohio Democratic Party v. LaRose, 159 N.E.3d 1241, 1249–53 (Ohio Ct. App. 2020).
Id. at 1256–57.
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pending appeal in an opinion that noted, inter alia, the appeals court’s view that
the Secretary of State would likely succeed on the merits as the restriction on
drop boxes was both reasonable and nondiscriminatory and “promote[d]
uniformity, which in turn promotes the fair administration of elections.”153
Judge Helene White’s dissent from the Sixth Circuit’s decision, by
contrast, is noteworthy for the great weight she gave to the role of the county
boards under Ohio law and as a matter of common sense in deciding on the
number and location of drop boxes. As she explained, “the legislature crafted a
statute that . . . places primary responsibility for administering elections in
bipartisan county boards of elections. These boards have the duty to oversee the
administration of elections, including the duty to ‘[f]ix and provide the places
for registration and for holding primaries and elections.’”154 As she noted,
“Although the Secretary has overall control of the election, and may promulgate
directives, the individual county boards are granted the authority to control the
local aspects of elections. . . . This makes sense; county populations, geographic
dimensions, and infrastructure vary considerably throughout the state.”155 Like
the state trial court, she dismissed the Secretary’s asserted interest in statewide
uniformity in the number of drop boxes per county as “ignor[ing] that each
county has its own bipartisan election commission with knowledge of the
county’s needs. Uniformity in the number of ballot drop-off locations across
counties with 850,000 voters and counties with less than 10,000 voters promotes
unequal, rather than uniform, voting opportunities.”156
4. Texas
State and local officials clashed in state and federal courts over three issues
affecting the availability of absentee ballots for Texas voters—eligibility, access
to absentee ballot applications, and drop boxes. The first round broke out in the
spring when a group of voters and the Texas Democratic Party sued the Travis
County Clerk to expand the availability of mail voting.157 Texas law limits mail
voting to voters sixty-five and older or who have a “physical condition that
prevents the voter from appearing at the polling place on election day without
a likelihood . . . of injuring the voter’s health.”158 The plaintiffs sought a
declaration that the widespread community transmission of COVID-19 meant
that every voter had a disability entitling them to vote by mail. The Travis
County District Court agreed, directing both the county and the state to accept
153. A. Philip Randolph Inst. of Ohio v. LaRose, 831 F. App’x 188, 192 (6th Cir. 2020).
154. Id. at 193 (White, J., dissenting) (quoting OHIO REV. CODE § 3501.11 (2020)).
155. Id. at 194 (citing OHIO REV. CODE §§ 3501.04, 3501.05, 3501.11).
156. Id.
157. Travis County is the home of Austin and is the fifth most populous county in the state. Travis
County, PLACE & SEE, https://placeandsee.com/wiki/travis-county [https://perma.cc/KKF5-M6W9].
158. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 82.002(a)(1), 82.003 (Westlaw through the end of the 2021 Reg.
and Called Sess. of the 87th Leg.).
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absentee ballot applications and absentee ballots from all voters who claimed
disability due to COVID-19 for the July 14 runoff election and all subsequent
elections in 2020.159 The State immediately appealed. Travis County did not.
Rather, Travis County, joined by four other counties—including Harris County
(Houston) and Dallas County, the two most populous counties in the state—
sought to defend the district court’s order.160
While the State’s appeal was pending, Attorney General Ken Paxton
issued a “guidance letter” rejecting the Travis County District Court’s
interpretation of the mail-in ballot law. The letter directed county election
officials to disregard the court’s interpretation and threatened “third parties”
with criminal penalties if they “advise voters to apply for a ballot by mail for
reasons not authorized by the Election Code, including fear of contracting
COVID-19 without an accompanying qualifying disability.”161 After winning a
temporary victory before the court of appeals, the plaintiffs ultimately lost when
the Texas Supreme Court unanimously agreed with the Attorney General that
lack of immunity to COVID-19 is not a “disability.”162 But the court rejected
the Attorney General’s request for a writ of mandamus.163
The court’s opinion—complemented by the three concurring opinions—
has two striking features. First, the court gave considerable attention to the
statements by county election officers and other LEOs supporting the district
court’s reading of disability.164 The court also acknowledged county efforts to
promote voting by mail and to obtain additional funding to handle the influx of
mail-in ballots.165 This seems to have been intended to justify the court’s
conclusion that the county officials had not “gone rogue” and would abide by
the court’s decision so that a writ of mandamus need not be issued. The
discussion also underscored the role of LEOs in voicing the concerns of local
voters. As the court noted, the Harris County Clerk explained that “[e]lection
officials . . . have advised [voters] to vote by mail if they do not have immunity
to a highly contagious disease that is likely to injure their health.”166 The Harris
County District Attorney urged that “Harris County wishes to increase the
ratio of VBM [vote by mail] as a practical not a partisan matter because doing
159. Tex. Democratic Party v. DeBeauvoir, No. D-1-GN-20-001610, 2020 Tex. Dist. LEXIS 983,
at *7–8 (Apr. 17, 2020).
160. See generally In re State, 602 S.W.3d 549, 550 (Tex. 2020) (noting that the State petitioned
the Texas Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus upon entry of the Travis County District Court’s
order).
161. Letter from Ken Paxton, Att’y Gen. of Texas, to County Judges and County Election Officials
(May 1, 2020), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/images/admin/2020/Press/
Mail-in%20Ballot%20Guidance%20Letter_05012020.pdf [https://perma.cc/5NVA-RF8H].
162. In re State, 602 S.W.3d at 550.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 554–57.
165. Id. at 554.
166. Id.
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so will enable less crowded conditions during in-person voting and thus better
social distancing.”167 Similarly, the court explained that the Dallas County
Commissioners Court—the county’s governing body—“issued a resolution
stating that due to the threat of COVID-19, any voter who wanted a mail-in
ballot could check the box indicating a disability.”168 Although the court was not
persuaded by the urban counties, it was willing to give voice to their concerns.
Second, in declining the Attorney General’s request for a writ of
mandamus, the justices left some room for a broader COVID-19-influenced
reading of “disability” than the Attorney General was willing to recognize. The
court confirmed the position of the county election officers that they had no
duty to probe a voter’s disability claim.169 And the court agreed that “a voter
can take into consideration aspects of his health and his health history that are
physical conditions in deciding whether, under the circumstances, to apply to
vote by mail because of disability.”170 So, if a voter was concerned that she might
be particularly susceptible to the virus or to a more serious case if infected, she
might conclude she qualified for an absentee ballot, and the local election officer
would have no obligation—or authority—to challenge her.171
A second round of state-local conflict occurred in August and September
when Harris County Clerk Chris Hollins announced he would mail every
registered voter in the county an application to vote by mail. The Director of
Elections ordered him to drop the plan. When it was unclear whether Hollins
would comply, the State sued, claiming the plan was beyond the clerk’s
authority.172 Hollins enjoyed initial success in the local district court, which
denied the State’s application for a temporary injunction,173 and in the state
court of appeals, which affirmed.174 The State argued that Hollins’s proposal
would confuse voters and cause some ineligible voters to apply for an absentee
ballot, potentially “walking them into a felony.”175 But the appeals court
emphasized the “educational nature of the materials sent with the applications,
specifically, the red-siren graphics accompanying a warning that, despite
receiving the application, not all voters are eligible to vote by mail.”176 Indeed,
rather than confuse voters, the court of appeals found that for voters deciding
167. Id.
168. Id. at 556.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 560.
171. Id. at 561. Five justices in three concurring opinions went beyond the opinion of the court in
emphasizing the final authority of the voter to determine whether, due to the pandemic, she is entitled
to vote by mail. See id. at 562–63 (Guzman, J., concurring); id. at 563–64 (Boyd, J., concurring); id. at
567–71 (Bland, J., concurring).
172. State v. Hollins, 607 S.W.3d 923, 925 (Tex. Ct. App. 2020).
173. Id. at 927.
174. Id. at 930.
175. Id. at 925.
176. Id. at 926.
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whether they were eligible to vote by mail based on having a disability, the
Harris County mailer was quite helpful.177 The Secretary of State’s website
failed to define disability, whereas the Harris County mailer provided the
necessary information “including important details” that would be useful to
voters making that decision, meaning there was little danger that a voter would
commit fraud because of the mailer.178 The court noted the Director of
Elections’ own statement that the Secretary of State doesn’t “allow or disallow
counties to do anything. Counties are the ones that run elections in Texas, we
assist and advise.”179
The state supreme court, however, reversed and granted the temporary
injunction.180 The court emphasized the limited authority of county election
officers in light of the “subordinate and derivative” position of counties, which
possess “no sovereignty distinct from the state,” and, in Dillon’s Rule language,
“only such powers and privileges as have been expressly or impliedly conferred
upon them.”181 The court rejected Hollins’s argument that the state Election
Code’s grant of authority to county clerks to conduct voting by mail—called
“early voting” under Texas law—or the clerk’s more general statutory powers
to manage and conduct elections locally impliedly authorized clerks to mail
unsolicited ballot applications to all registered voters.182 Although Texas law did
not forbid his action, it failed to provide the authorization that the court’s
Dillon’s Rule reading of county clerk election authority required and so was
ultra vires. The court stressed the importance of uniform application of the
election code throughout the state as a justification for blocking local voting
initiatives.183 The court concluded that notwithstanding the lack of evidence
that the county clerk’s action would harm the integrity of the electoral process,
the state’s “sovereign” interest in overseeing its local governments and
preventing local misapplication of state law supported granting the temporary
injunction.184
The final Texas state-local conflict was, as in Ohio, over options for
returning absentee ballots. Governor Abbott issued an order on July 27, 2020,
permitting absentee voters to return their ballots to county ballot centers early
and in-person; that order did not impose a limit on the number of return centers

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id. at 928.
Id.
Id.
State v. Hollins, 620 S.W.3d 400, 403 (Tex. 2020).
Id. at 403–04.
Id. at 406–08.
Id. at 408.
Id. at 409–10.
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per county.185 In response, many counties “decided to offer multiple ballot
return centers because ‘the size of some counties would make it difficult, if not
impossible, for some voters to return their ballots to election administration
headquarters in each county.’”186 Harris County, for example, planned on eleven
centers; Fort Bend County on five;187 and Travis and Galveston Counties
announced plans for multiple return centers.188 However, on October 1, 2020,
Governor Abbott issued a new order limiting the number of ballot return
centers to one per county, citing the need for ballot security, and giving county
officials less than twenty-four hours to close their satellite ballot return
centers.189 When voters and a pair of voting rights organizations brought suit, a
federal district court granted a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of
the order on the grounds that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claims
that the order placed an undue burden on the right to vote and resulted in
disparate treatment of absentee voters living in larger, more populous
counties.190 The court also addressed the burden the order placed on county
officials, citing LEO statements and stating that they would have to address
“the confusion and logistical complications created by the October 1 Order”;
the administrative burden of “having to change our voter education materials
and our staff training”; the impact on county efforts to meet federal
requirements for accommodating disabled voters; and the threat to the health
of election workers from increasing their exposure to the COVID-19.191
However, the Fifth Circuit in short order reversed,192 finding that the
gubernatorial order’s limitation on ballot return locations placed little or no
burden on the right to vote and was justified by the state’s interest in ballot
security and uniformity in the administration of election law.193 Any burden
imposed on voters in larger or more populous counties was dismissed as de
minimis: “More to the point, it applies a uniform rule to every Texas county
and does not weight the votes of those in some counties more heavily than

185. Tex. Governor Greg Abbott, Proclamation Suspending Certain Statutes Concerning
Elections on November 3, 2020 (July 27, 2020), https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/PROC_
COVID-19_Nov_3_general_election_IMAGE_07-27-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/HD8J-N7D2].
186. Tex. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Abbott, 493 F. Supp. 3d 548, 560 (W.D. Tex.
2020).
187. Id.
188. Tex. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Hughs, 978 F.3d 136, 141 (5th Cir. 2020).
189. Abbott, 493 F. Supp. 3d at 560.
190. Id. at 581–82.
191. Id. at 563–64. The Travis, Harris, Fort Bend and El Paso County Clerks or Election
Administrators were technically defendants in the suit, but the court repeatedly cited their declarations
in support of its decision to enjoin the Governor’s October 1 Order. See id. at 548, 559, 562–65, 580.
192. Hughs, 978 F.3d at 149–50.
193. Id. at 147–48 (noting that only 4 of 254 counties use multiple ballot return locations).
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others.”194 As in Ohio,195 formal uniformity across counties was used to deny
equal treatment to the voters in the more populous counties.
A similar scenario played out in the state courts, with the trial court
enjoining the governor’s order, the court of appeals affirming the injunction,
and the Texas Supreme Court staying the injunction and then reversing.196 The
state court echoed the Fifth Circuit’s analysis of the right-to-vote issues but
gave more attention to the state-local aspect of the conflict, specifically rejecting
the argument that the governor’s order improperly “intrudes on local officials’
prerogatives.”197 Indeed, in rejecting the argument that the order disparately
burdened voters in populous or geographically large counties, the court sought
to rationalize it as consistent with what it described as “Texas’s county-based
system of elections.”198 Under that system,
county lines are frequently what determines how convenient voting may
be for any given voter. The plaintiffs’ assertion that the Constitution is
violated when voters of one county face slightly greater logistical barriers
than voters in another county . . . if taken seriously . . . would condemn
Texas’s county-based election apparatus to interminable litigation.199
* * *
The state-local election litigations in these four states are marked by two
common themes. First, the willingness of some urban-area LEOs, aware of the
practical difficulties facing their constituents in voting during the pandemic, to
adopt expansive interpretations of their powers to facilitate voting and oppose
the voting-restrictive actions of state officials, whether as litigants, amici, or
affiants, in court. Second, when LEO activism was challenged by state officials,
the LEOs nearly always lost, sometimes after an initial lower court victory.
State supreme courts and federal courts of appeals repeatedly focused on the
limited nature of local authority, the hierarchical superiority of state officers,
and the asserted value of statewide uniformity in the application of state
election laws, notwithstanding the considerable interlocal variation in the
conditions and circumstances of voting. In elections at least, statewide
uniformity may often lead to the unequal treatment of voters from different
localities. State supremacy and the asserted interest in uniformity also mark the
state legislative attack on LEOs in 2021, which is the subject of the next part.

194. Id. at 149.
195. See supra notes 146–56 and accompanying text.
196. Abbott v. Anti-Defamation League Austin, Sw. & Texoma Regions, 610 S.W.3d 911, 916,
923 (Tex. 2020).
197. Id. at 918.
198. Id. at 923.
199. Id.
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III. BACKLASH: THE STATE LEGISLATIVE ATTACK ON ELECTION LAW
LOCALISM
2021 witnessed a tsunami of state legislative action in Republicandominated states to make voting more difficult and the administration of
election laws more partisan. These states adopted measures that burden mail
voting and early voting, impose “harsher voter ID requirements, and make[]
faulty voter purges more likely.”200 With respect to election administration,
they reduce the role of state-level election officials in offices currently held by
Democrats or by Republicans who displayed some commitment to professional
implementation of voting laws in 2020.201 Although the attack on independent
election administration targeted some state officers, a particularly striking
feature of the 2021 legislative reaction to the expansion of access to the ballot
in 2020 was the rash of laws undermining LEOs.202 This assault on local election
administration has three main strands:
(i) Denying LEOs the authority to take some of the specific actions
they took or attempted to take in 2020, such as by prohibiting the
sending of mail ballot applications to voters who did not request them;203
limiting the number, availability or location of early voting places and
drop boxes; and barring mobile, drive-through, curbside, or 24-hour
voting.204

200. See, e.g., Voting Laws Roundup: October 2021, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 4, 2021),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-october-2021 [https:
//perma.cc/4YSD-H2AS]; A Threat to Our Democracy: Election Subversion in the 2021 Legislative Session,
VOTING RTS. LAB (Sept. 29, 2021), https://votingrightslab.org/a-threat-to-our-democracy-electionsubversion-in-the-2021-legislative-session/ [https://perma.cc/S3TH-LRDJ].
201. See, e.g., Quinn Scanlan, 10 New State Laws Shift Power over Elections to Partisan Entities, ABC
NEWS (Aug. 16, 2021, 3:29 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/dozen-state-laws-shift-powerelections-partisan-entities/story?id=79408455 [https://perma.cc/K9JK-WYKH].
202. The backlash did not end in 2021 but continued into 2022. See, e.g., Shawn Johnson,
GOP Election Bills Would Make Legislature More Powerful and Absentee Voting More Difficult, WIS. PUB.
RADIO (Feb. 9, 2022, 5:00 AM), https://www.wpr.org/gop-election-bills-would-make-legislaturemore-powerful-and-absentee-voting-more-difficult [https://perma.cc/5D8G-FLEV]; Michael Wines,
Republicans Want New Tool in Elusive Search for Voter Fraud: Election Police, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 20, 2022),
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/20/us/voting-rights-election-police.html [https://perma.cc/RNR6LV4M (dark archive)]; Arizona Republicans Continue Voter Suppression and Election Subversion
Efforts, DEMOCRACY DOCKET (Jan. 25, 2022), https://www.democracydocket.com/alerts/arizonarepublicans-continue-voter-suppression-and-election-subversion-efforts/ [https://perma.cc/7R66-TK
7A] (describing bills to eliminate early voting, no-excuse mail-in voting, and emergency voting
centers); Virginia Republicans Introduce 20 Bills To Restrict Mail-In Voting, DEMOCRACY DOCKET (Jan.
18, 2022), http://www.democracydocket.com/alerts/virginia-republicans-introduce-20-bills-to-restrict
-mail-in-voting/ [https://perma.cc/C5KD-UZ3R].
203. See, e.g., Election Integrity Act of 2021, § 25(a)(1)(C)(ii), 2021 Ga. Laws 14, 38–39 (codified
at GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-381 (2021)); Act of Mar. 8, 2021, § 43(1)(c), 2021 Iowa Acts 22, 31 (codified
at IOWA CODE § 53.2(1)(c) (2021)).
204. See, e.g., Election Integrity Act of 2021 § 20, 2021 Ga. Laws at 33–34 (codified at GA. CODE
ANN. § 21-2-266 (2021)); Act of Mar. 8, 2021 § 53, 2021 Iowa Acts at 32–33 (codified at IOWA CODE
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(ii) Making it harder for LEOs to do their jobs generally, such as by
prohibiting them from accepting private donations,205 which were crucial
to the ability of many local agencies to successfully conduct elections in
2020; by imposing new reporting requirements;206 or by giving new
rights to potentially disruptive partisan poll watchers.207
(iii) Taking a page from the punitive preemption playbook208 and
authorizing the imposition of fines or criminal penalties for local actions
deemed inconsistent with state law and providing for the removal of local
officials and their replacement by state designees.209

§ 53.17(1) (2021)); Election Integrity Protection Act of 2021, §§ 3.04, 3.12–3.13, ch. 1, 2021 Tex. Sess.
Law Serv. (West) (codified at TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 43.031, 85.061(a), 85.062 (2021)).
205. See, e.g., Election Integrity Act of 2021 § 9, 2021 Ga. Laws at 24–25 (codified at GA. CODE
ANN. § 21-2-71 (2021)); Act of May 3, 2021, § 1(c), 2021 Kan. Sess. Laws 1107, 1107 (codified at KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 25-2436(c) (2021)); Act of June 30, 2021, § 3501.054(B), 2021 Ohio HB 110 (LexisNexis)
(codified at OHIO REV. CODE § 3501.054(B) (2021)).
206. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 8, 2021 §§ 60, 64, 2021 Iowa Acts at 34, 35 (codified at IOWA CODE
§§ 53.19(1), 53.30 (2021)) (adding new reporting requirements concerning absentee ballots, including
date returned, date opened, method of return, and concerning affidavits and provisional ballots).
207. See, e.g., id. § 45 (codified at IOWA CODE § 53.2); Election Integrity Protection Act of 2021
§ 2.09, 2021 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (West) (codified at TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 87.028 (2021)).
208. Cf. Briffault, supra note 11, at 2002–08 (discussing the rise of punitive preemption).
209. See, e.g., Election Integrity Act of 2021 §§ 6–7, 2021 Ga. Laws at 21–22 (codified at GA. CODE
ANN. § 21-2-33 (2021)); Act of Mar. 8, 2021 § 9–11, 2021 Iowa Acts at 23 (codified at IOWA CODE
§§ 39A.6–7 (2021)) (providing for fines of up to $10,000 and suspension of county election
commissioners for “technical infractions” of election law, and for referrals to the attorney general for
investigation and prosecution); Election Integrity Protection Act of 2021 §§ 2.06, 4.06, 4.09, 7.04,
2021 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (West) (codified at TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 18.065, 33.051, 33.061(a),
276.015–019 (2021)) (creating new offenses for local election boards or officials).
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Although laws with one or more of these measures were adopted in a wide range
of states, including Arizona,210 Arkansas,211 Florida,212 Indiana,213 Kansas,214
Ohio,215 and South Carolina,216 arguably the most sweeping measures—worthy
of some detailed attention—were enacted in Georgia, Iowa, and Texas.
Georgia. Georgia’s S.B. 202 was the first of 2021’s major anti-local voting
laws. The measure, which took effect in March 2021, combines all of the major
elements of antilocal voting change, including restrictions on pro-democracy
actions, burdens on LEO performance, and threats to displace local
administration. The law prohibits sending absentee ballot applications that have
not been specifically requested by the voter;217 prohibits the use of portable or
mobile polling facilities other than during an emergency declared by the
governor;218 limits possible early voting sites;219 and limits the number of drop
boxes to the lesser of one per 100,000 registered voters or the number of early
voting locations.220 Many of these provisions seem directly targeted at actions
210. See Act of Apr. 9, 2021, ch. 199, 2021 Ariz. Legis. Serv. (West) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-407.01 (2021)) (prohibiting acceptance of private donations for preparing for or conducting
an election); Act of July 9, 2021, § 1L, 2021 Ariz. Legis. Serv. (West) (codified at ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-542L (2021)) (prohibiting mailing early ballots to voters who have not requested one).
211. See Act of Apr. 27, 2021, § 1, Act 736, 2021 Ark. Legis. Serv. (West) (codified at ARK. CODE.
ANN. § 7-1-103 (2021)) (prohibiting distribution of unrequested absentee ballots and increasing
requirements concerning handling of absentee ballots); Act of Apr. 27, 2021, §§ 1–2, Act 973, 2021 Ark.
Legis. Serv. (West) (codified at ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 7-5-404(a)(3)(A), -411(a)(2)–(3) (2021))
(eliminating ability to return absentee ballots to satellite offices); Act of Apr. 27, 2021, §§ 1–7, Act 974,
2021 Ark. Legis. Serv. (West) (codified in scattered sections of ARK. CODE. ANN.) (adding new
procedures for investigating and new penalties for violations of election laws).
212. See Act of May 6, 2021, §§ 2, 24(1)(c)(7), 28, 31, ch. 2021-11, 2021 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. (West)
(codified at FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.62(1)(c)(7), 101.69, 102.141, 97.0291 (2021)) (barring unrequested
provision of absentee ballots or acceptance of private funds; increasing poll watcher access; imposing
new requirements concerning drop boxes; and reporting concerning absentee ballots and Election Day
vote tabulations).
213. See Act of Apr. 23, 2021, Pub. L. No. 109-2021, 2021 Ind. Acts 1022 (codified in scattered
sections of IND. CODE) (prohibiting acceptance of private contributions for “preparing, administering,
or conducting elections”).
214. Act of May 3, 2021, § 1, 2021 Kan. Sess. Laws 1107, 1107 (codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 252436 (2021)) (prohibiting acceptance or use of private contributions for election administration).
215. See Act of June 30, 2021, § 3501.054(B), 2021 Ohio HB 110 (codified at OHIO REV. CODE
§ 3501.054(B) (2021)) (prohibiting acceptance of private contributions “for any costs or activities
related to voter registration, voter education, voter identification, get-out-the-vote, absent voting,
election official recruitment or training, or any other election-related purpose”).
216. See H.B. 3444, 124th Gen. Assemb., 2021–2022 Reg. Sess. § 1 (S.C. 2021) (requiring county
boards of elections to follow the “standardized processes” as well as the policies and procedures of the
State Election Commission, with penalties for noncompliance). As this Article was going to press, H.B.
3444 had passed the South Carolina Senate but had not yet been approved by the state House of
Representatives.
217. Election Integrity Act of 2021, § 25(a)(1)(C)(ii), 2021 Ga. Laws 14, 38–39 (codified at GA.
CODE ANN. § 21-2-381 (2021)).
218. Id. § 20(b) (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-266(b)).
219. Id. § 26(c)(1)–(4) (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-382(c)).
220. Id. § 26(c)(1) (codified at GA. CODE. ANN. § 21-2-382(c)(1)).
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that Fulton County and other metro-area Atlanta election offices took in 2020.
For example, the law would prohibit Fulton from using the two mobile voting
vans that it purchased and used in 2020 and would cut the number of drop boxes
from the ninety-four used in 2020 to a maximum of twenty-three.221 The law
not only limits the number of drop boxes but also prohibits making them
accessible twenty-four hours a day as many were in 2020. Instead, they must be
placed indoors in government buildings and accessible only during early voting
hours, making them unavailable during nonbusiness hours and, thus, useless to
working voters who have daytime jobs.222
Beyond these obstacles to making voting easier, S.B. 202 places new
constraints on the ability of LEOs to do their jobs. It bars local election boards
from accepting private funding,223 which was crucial to the ability of many
LEOs to address the challenges posed by COVID-19.224 It makes it easier for
poll watchers to challenge voters by eliminating limits on the number of
challenges a poll watcher can make.225 It also imposes new administrative
requirements such as the printing of ballots on costly “security paper”226 to
enable ballot authentication, tighter deadlines for key election processes like
absentee ballot processing and vote counting,227 and more requirements to track
the types and total number of ballots cast.228 Precinct-level officials must now
report the number of Election Day and provisional ballots as soon as the polls
close; counting and tabulating “shall not cease” until all such ballots are counted
and tabulated; and they must report by 10 p.m. the day after Election Day all
ballots cast on Election Day, all ballots cast during early voting, and all absentee
ballots returned by the Election Day deadline.229 These reporting requirements

221. See Nick Corasaniti & Reid J. Epstein, What Georgia’s Voting Law Really Does, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/02/us/politics/georgia-voting-law-annotated.html [http://perma.cc
/CNC2-7QEH (dark archive)] (Aug. 18, 2021).
222. Id.; Election Integrity Act of 2021 § 26, 2021 Ga. Laws at 43–44 (codified at GA. CODE ANN.
§ 21-2-382 (2021)).
223. Election Integrity Act of 2021 § 14, 2021 Ga. Laws at 28 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 212-212 (2021)).
224. See, e.g., Emma Hurt, Why Local Election Officials in Georgia Take Issue with Many Parts of New
Law, NPR (Apr. 16, 2021, 5:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/04/16/987825440/why-local-electionofficials-in-georgia-take-issue-with-many-parts-of-new-law [https://perma.cc/DE6V-XZQ6] (quoting
statement by Douglas County Registrar in suburban Atlanta that grants from nonprofits were the “only
reason” his county was able to afford the election).
225. Election Integrity Act of 2021 §§ 15–16, 2021 Ga. Laws at 28–31 (codified at GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 21-2-229 to -230 (2021)).
226. Id. § 23 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-372 (2021)).
227. Id. § 36 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2-420 to -421 (2021)).
228. Id. § 28 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-385 (2021)).
229. Id. § 36 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2-420 to -421 (2021)).
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will likely be particularly burdensome for populous metropolitan area
counties.230
Most troubling for the prospect of local pro-democracy initiatives in
election administration, the law authorizes the State Election Board231 to
suspend and replace local superintendents of elections.232 This would follow a
“performance review” that could be initiated either by the state board itself or
by a small number of state legislators from the affected county.233 Although
there is certainly some justification for state oversight of the performance of
local elections offices,234 in the current climate of intense political polarization
and sharp policy and ideological divisions in some states between suburban and
rural-dominated state governments and voters in urban areas, the new local
board suspension authority raises the prospect of a hostile red state government
taking over election administration in blue counties for partisan purposes. As if
to substantiate this fear, Republican state officials wasted little time in targeting
the new removal process on Democratic Fulton County, when the State
Election Board in mid-August 2021 appointed a majority-Republican panel to
review the performance of the county election board.235 Subsequently, the
Fulton County elections director announced his resignation as of the end of
2021.236
Iowa. Iowa’s 2021 election law also combines limits, burdens, and
punishments. It prohibits local election commissioners from sending an

230. Id.; Stephen Fowler, 2020 Was Tough but Georgia Election Officials Say Future Elections Won’t Be
Easier, NPR (Sept. 4, 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/09/04/1034128221/2020-was-tough-but-georgiaelection-officials-say-future-elections-wont-be-easie [https://perma.cc/WD3E-KFK3]; Hurt, supra note
224.
231. The law also restructures the State Election Board to increase the influence of the legislature
and reduce that of the independently elected secretary of state. Previously the secretary of state had
been the chair of the board. Under S.B. 202, the secretary is reduced to an ex officio nonvoting member;
all the voting members are selected by the legislature, or by the governor, who must appoint nominees
designated by the executive committees of the state political parties. Election Integrity Act of 2021 § 6,
2021 Ga. Laws at 21 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-33.1 (2021)).
232. Id.
233. Id. §§ 7, 11–12 (codified at GA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-2-33.2, -92, -105 to -108 (2021)).
234. For example, after recounting numerous incidents of egregious errors by local boards of
election across New York, a New York State Senate committee presented moderate and well-reasoned
recommendations for expanding the state role with respect to local boards, including more standardsetting, training, and the resolution of partisan deadlocks. See N.Y. STATE S. ELECTIONS
COMM., REPORT AND FINDINGS OF THE NEW YORK STATE SENATE ELECTIONS COMMITTEE 31–
32 (2021), https://www.nysenate.gov/sites/default/files/press-release/attachment/elex1115_vfinal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JM7V-D2MD].
235. Nick Corasaniti, Potential G.O.P. Takeover of Atlanta-Area Election Board Inches Forward,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/18/us/politics/georgia-electionsrepublicans.html [https://perma.cc/KK7N-76HK (dark archive)].
236. See Associated Press, Election Director in Georgia’s Fulton County Resigning, U.S. NEWS (Nov.
3, 2021, 4:30 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2021-11-03/election-director-ingeorgias-fulton-county-resigning [https://perma.cc/2CG3-Q2G6].
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absentee ballot application unless the voter specifically requests one.237
Reflecting the litigation that took place in Iowa in 2020, it specifically prohibits
prefilling any field in an absentee ballot application other than the type or date
of the election.238 Tracking the anti-drop-box measures in other states, it limits
the number of drop boxes to one per county and requires that the drop box be
in the office of an elections commissioner or on property owned and maintained
by the county that surrounds a commissioner’s office.239 It imposes burdensome
new reporting requirements, including reports concerning the number of
absentee ballot forms received, ballots sent to voters, and ballots received from
voters with separate indications of whether the ballots were returned by mail,
drop box, or by hand.240 The law also includes multiple punitive provisions. It
makes it a crime—election misconduct in the third degree—for an LEO to
interfere with a poll watcher;241 threatens LEOs with felony prosecution for
election misconduct in the first degree for failing to perform election duties;242
and authorizes the imposition of fines of up to $10,000 on a county election
commissioner and suspension of the commissioner from office for up to two
years if the state election commissioner determines the LEO committed a
“technical infraction” of the election law.243
More generally, the law highlights the limited nature of LEO powers and
the hierarchical superiority of state law and state officials. It specifically
provides that “the county commissioner of elections does not possess home rule
powers with respect to the exercise of powers or duties related to the conduct
of elections prescribed by statute or rule, or guidance issued” by the state
commissioner of elections.244 The state commissioner may issue guidance,
binding on local boards, concerning election laws and rules without having to
go through the state’s rulemaking process245—thereby addressing and
eliminating an issue raised in the challenge to the Secretary of State’s 2020
order concerning absentee ballot applications.246 A local election official who
fails to follow the state commissioner’s guidance can be charged with first
degree election misconduct.247

237. See Act of Mar. 8, 2021, § 43, 2021 Iowa Acts 22, 31 (codified at IOWA CODE § 53.2 (2021))
(absentee ballot application); id. § 49 (codified at IOWA CODE § 53.8 (2021)) (absentee ballot).
238. Id. § 44 (codified at IOWA CODE § 53.2(2) (2021)).
239. Id. § 53 (codified at IOWA CODE § 53.17(1) (2021)).
240. Id. §§ 60, 64 (codified at IOWA CODE §§ 53.19(1), 53.30 (2021)).
241. Id. § 7 (codified at IOWA CODE § 39A.4(1)(b) (2021)).
242. Id. § 3 (codified at IOWA CODE § 39A.2(1) (2021)).
243. Id. §§ 9–11 (codified at IOWA CODE §§ 39A.6–7 (2021)).
244. Id. § 19 (codified at IOWA CODE § 47.2(1) (2021)).
245. Id. § 18 (codified at IOWA CODE § 47.1(1) (2021)).
246. See supra notes 133–35 and accompanying text.
247. Act of Mar. 8, 2021 § 3, 2021 Iowa Acts at 22 (codified at IOWA CODE § 39A.2(1) (2021)).
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Texas. Perhaps not surprising given the repeated state-local election
battles of 2020, Texas’s S.B. 1248—enacted after a protracted but ultimately
unsuccessful effort by the Democratic minority in the legislature to prevent a
quorum249—contains multiple provisions targeting local election officers. With
respect to the process of voting, it bars drive-through voting and twenty-fourhour voting.250 It also prohibits any voting in or collection of ballots by motor
vehicles.251 These were all techniques used by LEOs, particularly in urban
counties,252 to expand voters’ options. In Harris County alone, 127,000 voters
used drive-through voting in 2020.253 The law limits early voting to sites inside
buildings that are regularly maintained as offices for elections functions254 and
makes it illegal for LEOs to send mail ballot applications to anyone, including
voters eligible to vote by mail, who had not specifically requested an
application.255 Indeed, it makes it a felony for a public official to send someone
a mail ballot application that the person did not request or to prefill any part of
an application.256 It prohibits public officials from doing anything to “facilitate”
the distribution of absentee ballot applications by third parties, such as
nonpartisan community organizations or get-out-the-vote groups.257 The
combination of new requirements for mail ballots and restrictions on the ability
of LEOs to help voters comply with the law in distributing voter registration
and absentee ballot forms, as well as new requirements with respect to voter ID,
led to a sharp increase in the rejection of ballot applications for mail ballots for
Texas’s March 2022 primary election as well as additional burdens for LEOs
and voters alike.258 As this Article was going to press, a federal district enjoined,
248. Election Integrity Protection Act of 2021, ch. 1, 2021 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (West) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN.).
249. See, e.g., Benjamin Swasey, After a Bitter Fight, the Texas House Passes a Restrictive Voting Bill,
NPR (Aug. 27, 2021, 9:50 AM), https://www.npr.org/2021/08/27/1031154177/after-a-bitter-fight-thetexas-house-passes-a-restrictive-voting-bill [https://perma.cc/K8PQ-4Z4H].
250. Election Integrity Protection Act of 2021 §§ 3.09–10, 2021 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (West)
(codified at TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 85.005–006 (2021)).
251. Id. § 3.04 (codified at TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 43.031(b) (2021)).
252. Nick Corasaniti, Republicans Target Voter Access in Texas Cities, but Not Rural Areas,
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/24/us/politics/texas-republicans-voting.html [http://
perma.cc/EBT4-A5MJ (dark archive)] (May 30, 2021).
253. Election Integrity Protection Act of 2021 § 3.04, 2021 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (West) (codified
at TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 43.031(b) (2021)).
254. Id. § 3.12 (codified at TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 85.061(a) (2021)).
255. Id. § 5.04 (codified at TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 84.0111 (2021)).
256. Id. § 7.04 (codified at TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 276.015–9 (2021)).
257. Id. §§ 5.04, 7.04 (codified at TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. §§ 84.0111, 276.015–9 (2021)).
258. See, e.g., Alex Ura, Thousands of Texas Mail-In Votes Still in Jeopardy Under New GOP Voting
Restrictions, TEX. TRIB. (Mar. 2, 2022, 3:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2022/03/02/texasprimary-ballot-rejections/ [https://perma.cc/X9TF-WCHY]; Marissa Martinez, Texas Officials Bemoan
‘Lack of Foresight’ as They Struggle with GOP’s New Voting Law, POLITICO (Feb. 10, 2022, 4:31 AM),
https://www.politico.com/news/2022/02/10/texas-gop-voting-law-primaries-00007473 [https://perma.
cc/83GV-WXA5]; Eugene Scott, Election Officials in Texas Reject Hundreds of Ballot Applications Under
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as a violation of the First Amendment, a closely related provision of S.B. 1 that
makes it an offense, subject to criminal and civil penalties, for a local election
official to “solicit[] the submission of an application to vote by mail from a
person who did not request an application.”259
The law also provides significant new protections for partisan poll
watchers and punishments for poll workers who try to limit their potentially
disruptive activities. Poll watchers must be allowed “free movement” within a
polling place and are “entitled to sit or stand near enough to see and hear the
activity” at the polling place.260 Indeed, it is now a criminal offense for a poll
worker “to obstruct the view of a watcher or distance the watcher from the
activity or procedure to be observed in a manner that would make observation
not reasonably effective.”261 Poll watchers are entitled to watch poll closing
activities “including the sealing and transfer of a memory card, flash card, hard
drive, data storage device, or other medium” and to follow the transfer of
election materials to a regional tabulating center.262 The degrading of the
integrity of LEOs and the potential for partisan troublemaking could not be
clearer.263

State’s New Voting Restrictions, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2022, 5:34 PM), https://www.washington
post.com/politics/texas-voting-ballots-republicans/2022/01/14/97c3d2de-7580-11ec-b202-b9b92330d4
fa_story.html [https://perma.cc/N325-EQHJ (dark archive)].
259. Longoria v. Paxton, No. 21-CV-1223-XR (W.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2022) (order granting
preliminary injunction) (quoting TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 276.016(a)(1) (2021)).
260. Election Integrity Protection Act of 2021 § 4.07, 2021 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. (West) (codified
at TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 33.056 (2021)).
261. Id. § 4.09 (codified at TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 33.061 (2021)).
262. Id. § 4.08 (codified at TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 33.0605 (2021)).
263. As an example of the kind of harm these so-called “poll watcher” protection laws can inflict,
Texas’s Republican Attorney General Ken Paxton sought to indict the Travis County (Austin) Clerk
on the charge of unlawfully obstructing a poll watcher. See Reese Oxner, Amid Texas GOP’s Effort To
Question Electoral Integrity, Attorney General Tried To Indict Travis County Elections Chief, TEX. TRIB.
(Dec. 20, 2021, 7:00 PM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/12/20/texas-ken-paxton-travis-countyelections/ [https://perma.cc/HPB4-PUPQ]. The investigation grew out of a complaint from a poll
watcher that she was obstructed “from entering and completing her duties at the Travis County central
counting station.” Id. According Travis County Clerk Dana DeBeauvoir,
the biggest challenge she faced during [the 2020] election came from poll watchers, who, unlike
election workers, are inherently partisan figures . . . . “These poll watchers were getting in
people’s faces and [would] scream and spit. We’re in the middle of a pandemic. So the idea is
that they’re either deliberately trying to infect people or they’re just intimidating with that
implication,” she said.
Id. The case against DeBeauvoir was thrown out by the grand jury, but only after she had racked up
$75,000 in legal fees. Id. The county ultimately reimbursed the fees, although DeBeauvoir did not know
that when she paid them. Id. Under S.B. 1, unlawfully obstructing a poll watcher is a Class A
misdemeanor, punishable by up to a year in prison, a $4000 fine, or both. Id.; see also Paige St. John,
Election Watchers Snap Photos of Workers, Challenge Voter Signatures as Recall Nears, L.A. TIMES (Sept.
10, 2021, 12:38 PM), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2021-09-10/election-chiefs-wary-ofcalifornia-recall-vote-fraud-claims [https://perma.cc/UEB8-NAQZ (dark archive)].
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The backlash against LEOs—including name-calling, verbal abuse,
personal attacks, baseless claims of fraud, calls for audits, and threats of
violence—for doing their jobs is disturbing and has led to a surge in LEO
retirements and departures.264 And attacks on election workers did not end with
the 2020 election.265 What is particularly disquieting is the extent to which these
states have fed the narrative of LEO misconduct through legislative changes
that target the local actions, and the local authority, that contributed to the
success of the 2020 election.

264. See, e.g., Zach Montellaro, Local Election Officials Are Exhausted, Under Threat and Thinking
About Quitting, POLITICO (Mar. 10, 2022, 5:01 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/2022/03/
10/election-officials-exhausted-under-threat-00015850 [https://perma.cc/YT9P-4V4W]; Saja Hindi,
Colorado Clerks Targeted by Election-Fraud Conspiracy Groups, DENVER POST (Mar. 3, 2022), https://
www.governing.com/security/colorado-clerks-targeted-by-election-fraud-conspiracy-groups [https://
perma.cc/746F-AK2K]; Press Release, Off. of Pub. Affs., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Man Charged for
Threatening Nevada State Election Worker (Jan. 27, 2022), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/mancharged-threatening-nevada-state-election-worker [https://perma.cc/XM7M-Y7C2]; Gary Fineout, A
Dire Warning from Florida Election Officials, POLITICO (Oct. 21, 2021, 6:58 AM), https://www.
politico.com/newsletters/florida-playbook/2021/10/21/a-dire-warning-from-florida-election-officials494791 [https://perma.cc/W947-UDPR]; Jeremy Schwartz, Trump Won Hood County in a Landslide. His
Supporters Still Hounded the Elections Administrator Until She Resigned., TEX. TRIB. (Oct. 12, 2021, 5:00
AM), https://www.texastribune.org/2021/10/12/hood-county-elections-administrator-trump/ [https://
perma.cc/NJ7W-M4AU]; Tom Hamburger, Rosalind S. Hellerman & Amy Gardner, ‘We Are in
Harm’s Way’: Election Officials Fear for Their Personal Safety amid Torrent of False Claims About Voting,
WASH. POST (Aug. 11, 2021, 2:59 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/election-officialsthreats/2021/08/11/bb2cf002-f9ed-11eb-9c0e-97e29906a970_story.html [https://perma.cc/Z9S3-2R2T
(dark archive)]; Michael Wines, After a Nightmare Year, Election Officials Are Quitting, N.Y. TIMES (July
2, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/02/us/politics/2020-election-voting-officials.html [http://
perma.cc/TP4A-ALH6 (dark archive)] (discussing Iowa county LEO who quit because she feared
felony prosecution under Iowa’s new law for authorizing extra pay to recruit poll workers in 2020);
Carl Smith, Under Fire and Overworked, Election Officials Feel Unsafe, GOVERNING (June
18, 2021), https://www.governing.com/now/under-fire-and-overworked-election-officials-feel-unsafe
[https://perma.cc/Y3QN-WX53]; Election Officials Under Attack, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 16,
2021), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/election-officials-under-attack [http
://perma.cc/7ZUM-HLFN].
265. See, e.g., Tim Elfrink, As GOP Candidate Used RV for 24/7 Watch, Anchorage Election Staff Say
They Faced ‘Unprecedented Harassment,’ WASH. POST (May 28, 2021, 4:09 AM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/nation/2021/05/28/anchorage-election-harassment-bronson-dunbar/?utm_campa
ign=wp_main&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook [https://perma.cc/EW92-FUKE (dark archive)] (discussing intimidating and confrontational behavior by “citizen observers” supporting the
ultimately victorious candidate in the Anchorage, Alaska, mayoral runoff election); St. John, supra note
263 (discussing misinformation about and harassment of election workers in the September 2021
California gubernatorial recall vote).
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IV. LESSONS FROM ELECTION ADMINISTRATION LOCALISM: FOR
ELECTIONS AND FOR LOCALISM
A.

The Local Role in Election Administration

This Article spotlights the positive role local election officials played in
the 2020 election, but it would be a mistake to overstate the benefits of local
administration in running elections.
Local boards can be partisan or incompetent.266 Local officials may be slow
in carrying out federal mandates expanding voting rights.267 Interlocal
inconsistencies in the application of election rules can be troubling.268 The very
lack of uniformity in the conditions and circumstances of voting resulting from
extensive state delegation of the responsibility for election administration to
local governments with significantly different resources can result in the
unequal availability of the right to vote in different counties in the same state.269
The use of older or inadequately maintained voting technology in some counties
can lead to a higher error rate in the recording of votes.270 LEOs will not always
be professional or committed to the evenhanded administration of elections;
indeed, some may actively try to subvert the integrity of the election.271 The
significant role that local election offices played in 2020 has already sparked

266. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE S. ELECTIONS COMM., supra note 234, at 10–18 (recounting multiple
errors over a period of years by both New York City and upstate county boards of elections); Timothy
Bella, Georgia Election Workers Fired for Allegedly Shredding Hundreds of Voter Registration Forms, WASH.
POST (Oct. 12, 2021, 10:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/10/12/georgiafultoncounty-election-workers-fired/ [https://perma.cc/W7RE-ADTN (dark archive)]; Lach, supra
note 13; Magnarelli & Golden, supra note 13.
267. See, e.g., Weinstein-Tull, Election Law Federalism, supra note 54, at 759–60.
268. See, e.g., Ziccarelli v. Allegheny Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 2021 WL 101683, at *1 (W.D. Pa.
2021) (detailing how two counties within the same state senate district took different approaches to
whether a type of voter error required rejection of absentee ballots).
269. See, e.g., Cholden-Brown, supra note 62, at 129–30.
270. See, e.g., Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 871 (6th Cir. 2006). But cf. Wexler v. Anderson,
452 F.3d 1226, 1227 (11th Cir. 2006) (rejecting constitutional challenge to different manual recount
procedures in counties using different voting machinery); Cholden-Brown, supra note 62, at 134–35.
For a limited defense of interlocal variation in voting rules as an appropriate response to differences in
voting conditions, such as the size of the voting population, see Hasen, supra note 63, at 205–09.
271. See, e.g., Maggie Astor, Colorado County Clerk Indicted in Voting Security Breach Investigation,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/09/us/politics/tina-peters-coloradoelection.html [https://perma.cc/NWW2-XUJN (dark archive)]; Cristina Cabrera, Yet Another GOP
Colorado Election Clerk Faces Probe over Potential Election Security Breach, TALKING POINTS MEMO (Feb.
4, 2022, 2:50 PM), https://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/yet-another-gop-colorado-election-clerkprobed-over-potential-voting-security-breach [https://perma.cc/24BP-YBK7].
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efforts by partisans and ideologues—including at the local level272—to take
control of these offices.273
Nor were LEOs the only heroes in the 2020 election. Many state election
officers also took a leadership role in dealing with the unprecedented burdens
posed by COVID-19 and in expanding access to the ballot.274 So, too, state
officers resisted efforts by copartisans to undo election results.275 Democracyenhancing election administration need not be a matter of state versus local.
Still, given the long tradition of disparaging the local role in running
elections and the trend toward centralizing election law decision-making at the
state level, it is important to recognize what 2020 demonstrated—that local
election administration can provide an effective response to emergencies and
LEOs can move vigorously to vindicate access to the ballot for their
constituents.
This is not the place for a theory of the appropriate division of state and
local roles in election administration. It is unclear whether such a complete
theory is possible, just as it is unclear whether there can be a comprehensive
theory for the division of state and local roles more generally. However, a few
observations are possible.
First, many of the concerns at work in thinking about state-local relations
generally are relevant to election administration, but they may play out in
different ways. When the election involves a state or federal office or a state
272. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 264; Niall Stanage, The Memo: Attacks on Democracy Seep down
to School Boards, Election Offices, HILL (Sept. 4, 2021, 11:55 AM), https://thehill.com/homenews/thememo/570826-the-memo-attacks-on-democracy-seep-down-to-school-boards-election-offices [https://
perma.cc/U9G2-DR22]; Nick Corasaniti & Reid J. Epstein, How Republican States Are Expanding Their
Power over Elections, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/19/us/politics/republican-states.
html [https://perma.cc/ND97-DEE3 (dark archive)] (July 1, 2021) (describing how, in Georgia,
partisan county governments are using new laws to take control of local election boards).
273. See, e.g., Tim Reid, Nathan Layne & Jason Lange, Special Report: Backers of Trump’s False Fraud
Claims Seek To Control Next Elections, REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2021, 7:19 AM), https://www.reuters.com/
world/us/backers-trumps-false-fraud-claims-seek-control-next-us-elections-2021-09-22/ [http://perma
.cc/S5KX-7P8T (staff-uploaded archive)].
274. See, e.g., Why Your Secretary of State Matters, DEMOCRACY DOCKET (July 23, 2021),
https://www.democracydocket.com/explainers/why-your-secretary-of-state-matters/ [https://perma.cc
/VF53-4HR9] (citing the democracy-enhancing work of secretaries of state in Arizona, California,
Colorado, Michigan, and Vermont).
275. See, e.g., Richard Fausset, ‘It Has To Stop’: Georgia Election Official Lashes Trump, N.Y. TIMES,
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/01/us/politics/georgia-election-trump.html [https://perma.cc/5FH
3-JDSS (dark archive)] (Jan. 7, 2021); David Eggert, Zeke Miller & Colleen Long, Michigan Certifies
Biden Win Despite Trump’s GOP Overtures, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2020, 1:45 PM), https://www.latimes.
com/world-nation/story/2020-11-23/michigan-certifies-biden-win-despite-trumps-gop-overtures [http
://perma.cc/7R88-69NX]. But cf. David Eggert, GOP Replaces Canvasser Who Certified Biden’s Win in
Michigan, US NEWS (Jan. 19, 2021, 4:41 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/michigan/
articles/2021-01-19/whitmer-names-new-republican-to-michigan-election-board [https://perma.cc/D8
AE-9GFA (staff-uploaded archive)] (describing how Michigan Republicans refused to renominate to
the Board of State Canvassers the Republican canvasser who voted to certify Joe Biden’s win over
Donald Trump).
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ballot proposition, local rules can have an external effect on state policy or the
representation of voters beyond the locality.276 However, to the extent that local
measures operate to expand democracy (without raising the risk of fraud) and
increase the voice of a community’s voters, that can be handled by other
communities adopting similar measures rather than having the state suppress
the more democracy-enhancing locality.277 So, too, the problem of interlocal
variation in balloting rules—such as voting hours, drive-through voting,
satellite voting locations, and the use of drop boxes—is not a problem for voters
as each voter votes in only one place at one time. However, given possible voter
mobility between elections, centralizing the voter registration database with the
state as HAVA requires makes sense.278
Second, some general issues in local government law such as interlocal
inequality in resources and the limitations on personnel, skills, and
administrative capacity, particularly for smaller local units, are critical factors
in election administration. Many local governments lack staff with the expertise
necessary for handling the increasingly sophisticated questions of voting
technology evaluation and cybersecurity, so it makes sense to vest many aspects
of technology selection, cybersecurity requirements, and LEO training criteria
with the state. Given the possibility of local corruption or the capture of a local
board by a political faction, state performance standards and oversight are also
appropriate.279
Third, the 2020 election demonstrated that the greatest assets of local
election boards—as with local government generally—are their grasp of local
conditions and relationships with other local entities such as community groups,
nonprofits, for-profit businesses, and other local governments, which they can
use to leverage their resources and design and implement locally appropriate
voting mechanisms. As the record in many of the 2020 cases indicates, local
circumstances are incredibly diverse. Densely populated urban areas, sprawling
lightly populated rural areas, communities with large numbers of elderly people,
or localities where working people can’t get to the polls during ordinary business
hours all raise different issues for assuring access to the ballot. Local boards are
particularly well-positioned to understand distinctive local problems and adopt
local solutions. The many court decisions in 2020 that focused on the state’s
interest in uniformity in the balloting process got it exactly wrong. This is one
276. See, e.g., Cholden-Brown, supra note 62, at 118–20 (discussing spillovers from local election
decisions).
277. Cf. RICHARD BRIFFAULT, LAURIE REYNOLDS, NESTOR M. DAVIDSON, ERIN ADELE
SCHARFF & RICK SU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 419–20,
462–65 (9th ed. 2022) (discussing the significance of the presence or absence of external effects in
determining the appropriate scope of local decision-making).
278. See, e.g., Statewide Voter Registration Systems, U.S. ELECTION ASSISTANCE COMM’N (Aug. 31,
2017), https://www.eac.gov/statewide-voter-registration-systems [https://perma.cc/E4LL-UXUF].
279. See N.Y. STATE S. ELECTIONS COMM., supra note 234, at 31–32.
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area where mandating a leveling-down uniformity in the face of diverse local
conditions makes little sense; letting local boards use their local knowledge and
resources to address these varying local needs and problems seems the better
approach.280 Or, to borrow again from the general literature of state-local
relations, this seems like an area where state laws should be a floor and not a
ceiling.281
A final, and particularly speculative, point. Looking at the record of the
2020 election, it is striking to see how many local election offices acted as if
they felt they had a mission to make voting accessible and to enable as many
people as possible to vote.282 Perhaps because they were the frontline workers
in direct contact with voters and actually responsible for delivering the election
to their communities, they felt some obligation to make the election work. To
be sure, it is not clear that all local election boards acted that way—and many
state election officials also displayed that same sense of mission—but one
argument for protecting a local role in election administration is the possibility
that the more direct connection between government and individual members
of the public at the local level may itself provide an incentive for doing a
professional job.283
B.

Lessons for Localism from Local Election Administration

Local election administration ought to be a poor candidate for providing
lessons about localism generally. Most elections are run by counties, which
typically lack home rule and enjoy less lawmaking autonomy than
municipalities. With respect to state and federal elections, the local role is
formally administrative—to implement state laws and carry out state rules
locally. Local governments cannot engage in substantive policy-making with
280. See, e.g., BARRY C. BURDEN, THE EXPERIENCES OF MUNICIPAL CLERKS AND THE
ELECTORATE IN THE NOVEMBER 2020 GENERAL ELECTION IN WISCONSIN 29–34 (2021), https://
electionlawblog.org/wp-content/uploads/Burden-2020-Wisconsin-Election-Report.pdf [http://perma.
cc/PS7N-YGWK] (noting differences in commitment to public education and innovation in facilitating
voter access to the ballot varied between larger and smaller elections offices).
281. See, e.g., BRIFFAULT ET AL., THE NEW PREEMPTION READER, supra note 96, at 8–10; see
also BURDEN, supra note 280, at 34 (“When there are disagreements, the right statewide approach
might be to provide municipalities with options rather than mandates. Some minimum standards of
service need to be established for the entire state, . . . communities will . . . benefit from the ability to
innovate to serve the particular needs of their populations. For example, having a single set of statewide
deadlines for requesting and returning absentee ballots is essential so that voters are treated equally
under the law. On the other hand, it seems counterproductive to ban drop boxes in all communities or
to prevent clerks from allowing in-person absentee voters from inserting ballots directly into tabulators
because some smaller jurisdictions are not interested in these options.”).
282. See BURDEN, supra note 280, at 28 (noting that because 18% of clerks surveyed suggested that
the 2020 experience made them more likely to continue serving, “weathering the challenges of the
elections enhanced some clerks’ commitments to serving voters”).
283. See ADONA ET AL., supra note 33, at 23–24 (“The LEOs we surveyed overwhelmingly
expressed voter-centric attitudes and endorsed statements that value voter education and outreach.”).
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respect to federal and state elections, and there is little or no thought that they
should. In some states, the state is involved in the selection of LEOs, and state
executive branch officers oversee local election administration. From this
perspective, local elections commissioners and boards are indistinguishable
from state administrative officers carrying out state law locally.
Yet, local election administration does provide at least three lessons about
localism more generally. First, even with the severe restrictions on local power,
LEOs—many of whom are either locally elected or appointed by locally elected
officials—enjoy a degree of discretion and can make a difference in advancing
the interests of their constituents. Some of their actions were innovative, locally
responsive uses of their administrative discretion in finding new ways to hire
poll workers, locate and operate polling places, or implement early voting and
mail voting procedures. Others went beyond what state law clearly permitted
or occasionally challenged what state law required. When the state pushed back,
the LEOs typically lost. But in many counties and cities, LEOs used their
limited powers to do what all local governments at their best try to do—
implement locally developed or tailored policies that improve the lives of their
constituents. Even these extremely weak local units nicely demonstrate the
possibilities of activist local government.
Second, as with other local governments—albeit more so—the power of
local election officers is fragile and easily curtailed. Legislatures may adopt laws
stripping them of their powers and subjecting them to criminal penalties, or in
an extreme case, threaten them with impeachment.284 State governors, attorneys
general, or secretaries of state may issue directives limiting LEO discretion;
these will usually be sustained in court. Two of the pro-state strands that
dominate most state-local jurisprudence—the state’s formal hierarchical
superiority in the state-local structure and the asserted functional value of
statewide uniformity as a justification for preempting local innovation—
repeatedly recurred in 2020’s state-local election litigation. Recent and pending
state election law changes, with their mix of ideological restrictions,
requirements, and punishments, also resonate closely with the main themes of
the new preemption.
Third, the democratic accountability of local elections officers, which
contributed to the commitment of so many of them to vindicating the right to
vote, may also be their Achilles’ heel when antidemocratic forces mobilize at the
local level. Just as not all local communities support progressive values, with
many instead electing officials and adopting policies that promote more

284. See, e.g., Ford Turner, Pennsylvania House Republicans Threaten To Remove Lehigh County
Elections Board Unless It Rescinds Acceptance of Undated Absentee Ballots, MORNING CALL (Nov. 17, 2021,
7:27 PM), https://www.mcall.com/news/elections/mc-nws-pa-elections-house-reforms-20211117-ybyor
cfqmbarja2te2yhpnvokm-story.html [https://perma.cc/TG8F-YXAL (staff-uploaded archive)].
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politically conservative programs,285 not all local elections officers will be prodemocratic. In the aftermath of the 2020 election and former President Trump’s
repeated unsubstantiated claims of election fraud, in many states Trump
supporters have moved to take over local election offices. In Michigan, for
example, where the members of county election canvassing boards are
appointed by the political parties, local Republican leaders are replacing
Republicans on canvassing boards who voted to approve results showing a
Biden victory with other Republicans who have shown sympathy for the
Trumpian “big lie.”286 Where LEOs are elected, Trumpists are running for
these offices and winning. In Lancaster and York Counties, Pennsylvania,
candidates who embraced Trump’s false claims of election fraud won elections
as local election judges and election inspectors in 2021.287 One of these new local
election judges participated in the January 6, 2021, “Stop the Steal” rally that
led to the storming of the U.S. Capitol.288 Trump supporters are also seeking to
be hired to work inside local elections offices.289
Elections for local elections offices have traditionally been relatively
noncompetitive. The positions are relatively low level, and given the large
number of one-party jurisdictions, they are rarely contested at the general
election. The emergence of a corps of highly motivated partisan candidates and
applicants for these positions who “see the issue of election system control as a
matter of life and death,”290 could have the potential to undermine democracy

285. See, e.g., RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW
OUR GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 115–38 (2017) (discussing the local role in promoting
racial segregation); Shawn E. Fields, Second Amendment Sanctuaries, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 437–501
(2020) (discussing local resistance to state gun control laws); Eric E. Stern, Note, A Federal Builder’s
Remedy for Exclusionary Zoning, 129 YALE L.J. 1516, 1520–56 (2020) (discussing the local role in
promoting exclusionary zoning).
286. See Sam Levine, Why Are Michigan Republicans Quietly Replacing Key Election Officials?,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2021, 10:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/oct/14/michiganrepublicans-election-officials-fight-to-vote [https://perma.cc/99J6-VYA9 (staff-uploaded archive)];
Amy Gardner, Tom Hamburger & Josh Dawsey, Trump Allies Work To Place Supporters in Key Election
Posts Across the Country, Spurring Fears About Future Vote Challenges, WASH. POST (Nov. 29, 2021, 6:00
AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-allies-election-oversight/2021/11/28/3933b3ce
-4227-11ec-9ea7-3eb2406a2e24_story.html [https://perma.cc/5FT2-Z9JU (dark archive)] [hereinafter
Gardner et al., Spurring Fears].
287. Gardner et al., Spurring Fears, supra note 286.
288. See Charles Homans, In Bid for Control of Elections, Trump Loyalists Face Few Obstacles,
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/11/us/politics/trust-in-elections-trump-democracy.
html [https://perma.cc/37B6-WBKY (dark archive)] (Dec. 15, 2021).
289. Gardner et al., Spurring Fears, supra note 286; see also Stephanie McCrummen, ‘Gutted’: What
Happened When a Georgia Elections Office Was Targeted for Takeover by Those Who Claim the 2020 Election
Was a Fraud, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2022, 6:00 AM) (discussing consequences of dissolution of
nonpartisan county election board), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2022/03/14/georgiaelections-fraud-purge/ [https://perma.cc/Z6RB-3L6Y (dark archive)].
290. Homans, supra note 288.
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at the key point of contact between the election system and voters.291 Indeed,
there have already been instances of Trumpian local election officials
attempting to breach the security of local voting systems.292 On the other hand,
at the risk of grasping at straws, one possible consequence of the new attention
antidemocratic forces are giving to election administration293 at the state as well
as at the local level, is a dawning awareness by pro-democracy activists that
election administration is as critical to a viable democracy as the substantive
laws governing voting.294
Perhaps the most important lesson for localism is that election
administration localism may not be all that different from localism writ large.
Even when local power is limited it has the potential to be effective—but it is
fragile. When the state turns against local authority, the legal system offers local
governments little protection. And the kinds of policies local governments
pursue will reflect the outcome of local politics rather than any inherent political
bent in local government. Indeed, for election administration as for local
government generally, the defense of local authority turns on the degree of
political support for or opposition to what the local government has been doing
rather than on any commitment to localism per se.

291. See, e.g., Nicholas Riccardi, ‘Slow-Motion Insurrection’: How GOP Seizes Election
Power, AP NEWS (Dec. 30, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-united-states-electionselectoral-college-election-2020-809215812f4bc6e5907573ba98247c0 [http://perma.cc/D78M-DWHE]
(describing efforts by Republican extremists in Arizona, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin to
take control of election administration).
292. See, e.g., Amy Gardner, Emma Brown & Devlin Barrett, Attempted Breach of Ohio County
Election Network Draws FBI and State Scrutiny, WASH. POST (Nov. 19, 2021, 3:55 PM), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/attempted-breach-ohio-election/2021/11/19/12417a4c-488c-11ec-b8d9-23
2f4afe4d9b_story.html [https://perma.cc/42MB-J7ZF (dark archive)].
293. Another consequence is the unprecedented level of spending in elections for elected electionadministrative positions, such as secretary of state. See Ian Vandewalker & Lawrence Norden, Financing
of Races for Offices That Oversee Elections: January 2022, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 12, 2022),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/financing-races-offices-oversee-electionsjanuary-2022 [https://perma.cc/5WXG-WKW7].
294. See, e.g., Ezra Klein, Steve Bannon Is on to Something, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2022), https://
www.nytimes.com/2022/01/09/opinion/trump-bannon-trumpism-democracy.html [https://perma.cc/
PJ7R-24BM (dark archive)]; Michael Barajas, Voting Rights Advocates Search for Opportunities To
“Go Local” in Texas, BOLTS MAG. (Feb. 9, 2022), https://boltsmag.org/voting-rights-advocates-searchfor-openings-to-go-local-in-texas/ [https://perma.cc/E5SZ-ZNQ8] (discussing candidates in the
Democratic primary for Travis County Clerk competing on protecting and expanding access to the
ballot).
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